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This study investigates debt market effects of research and development (R&D) costs 
capitalization, using a global sample of public bonds and private syndicated loans issued by 
public non-financial firms. Firstly, we show that firms capitalize larger amounts of R&D in a 
year when they exhibit a propensity for issuing bonds, rather than borrowing funds privately 
from the syndicated loan market, in the subsequent year. Secondly, we provide evidence that 
capitalized R&D investments reduce the cost of debt. We infer that debt market participants 
are able to identify firms’ motives for R&D capitalization, as we find a reduction in the cost 
of debt only for those firms that do not show indications of employing R&D capitalization for 
earnings management reasons. Indeed, only for this sub-sample of firms, the amount of 
capitalized R&D contributes positively to future earnings. We confirm that R&D 
capitalization is positively associated with audit fees and thus can be deemed to be a 
signaling device. Lastly, we find that it is the amount of R&D a firm is expected to capitalize 
and not the discretionary counterparts, which facilitates a firm’s access to public debt 
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International Accounting Standard (IAS) 38 Intangible Assets, within International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), separates development expenditures from research costs and 
requires different treatment for each component. Research outlays must be expensed as 
incurred, but development costs must be capitalized when certain conditions are met. This 
contrasts with the requirements of United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(US GAAP) where both research costs and development expenditures must be expensed. 
Development costs capitalized under IAS 38 relate to R&D projects which are closer to being 
used or sold and hence bear less uncertainty regarding their future outcome. However, as 
fulfillment of the restrictive recognition criteria under IAS 38 requires managers to use 
proprietary information and exercise subjective judgement, R&D capitalization under IFRS is 
open to managerial discretion.  
We first investigate whether or not managers use this discretion as a means of facilitating 
borrowing from public debt markets, rather than entering private debt markets (i.e. the 
syndicated loan market). Thus, we examine if the amount of R&D a firm capitalizes in a 
given year is associated with a firm’s choice of the source of debt financing for the 
subsequent year. We then analyze the value relevance of R&D capitalization for debt markets 
by investigating the effect of capitalized development costs in a given year on the cost of 
public debt and private debt for the subsequent year. To the best of our knowledge, evidence 
on these two issues is absent. Prior studies examining the debt market consequences of R&D 
investments focus exclusively on US firms (Shi, 2003; Eberhart et al., 2008; Ciftci & 
Darrough, 2016) and thus rely on a setting for which discretionary R&D capitalization cannot 
be observed. 
We first hypothesize that firms capitalize larger amounts of R&D in a year when they 
show a higher propensity subsequently to raise funds from the public debt market rather than 
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the syndicated loan market (H1). The public debt market and syndicated loan market are 
regarded as mutual substitutes (e.g. Altunbaş et al., 2010), because in both markets firms can 
raise considerable amounts of funds with comparable maturity terms. However, the markets 
differ strongly in information asymmetry (Bharath et al., 2008; Altunbaş et al., 2010). Firms 
accessing the syndicated loan market are able to communicate the future success of their 
R&D projects via private channels, while bondholders in the public debt market do not have 
access to such channels (Bharath et al., 2008; Florou & Kosi, 2015). Thus, information in 
publicly available financial statements can be more important for bondholders in this context 
(Gorton & Winton, 2003; Bharath et al., 2008; Marshall et al., 2016). Consequently, for our 
chosen context, firms that plan to access public debt markets have greater incentives to signal 
the future success of their R&D investments and are willing to incur the necessary costs – 
including higher audit fees – to capitalize the corresponding development expenditures.  
Further, we hypothesize a negative association between capitalized R&D and the cost of 
public (H2) and private debt (H3). These hypotheses are motivated by the asymmetric payoff 
structure of debtholders. They bear the full extent of the downside risk, while their return is 
restricted to a fixed interest rate. Thus, debtholders are more concerned about bad news, 
which may affect their downside risk (Easton et al., 2009; Ball et al., 2008). As innovation 
projects show a high degree of technical and commercial uncertainty as well as a low success 
rate (Lev, 2001), the risk component and thus the trade-off between future benefits and risk 
of R&D investments is more prevalent for debt markets (Shi, 2003; Ciftci & Darrough, 
2016). Capitalized development costs should, therefore, be of particular importance to debt 
market participants. Arguably, the high reporting costs and audit effort involved in recording 
capitalized development costs (De George et al., 2013; Cheng et al., 2016; Kuo & Lee, 2017) 
could further assist debtholders to perceive capitalized development costs as a signal of 
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genuine future economic benefits resulting from less risky R&D projects. Hence, capitalized 
R&D investments should be priced positively, resulting in reduced debt costs. 
We test these hypotheses by using a global sample of bonds and private syndicated loans 
issued by public, non-financial firms in countries which mandated IFRS or fully converged 
their local GAAP with IFRS from 2005 onwards.  
Consistent with our first hypothesis, the propensity to borrow in the public debt market 
rather than the private syndicated loan market in a given year is positively associated with 
higher amounts of R&D having been capitalized during the previous year. Regarding the cost 
of public debt, we find that R&D costs are priced differently for firms that expense all of their 
R&D investments (Expensers) and for firms that capitalize all or some of their R&D 
investments (Capitalizers). For Expensers, R&D expenditure reduces bond prices. This is in 
line with the literature on US firms (Eberhart et al., 2008), where firms expense all their R&D 
investments. For Capitalizers, the capitalized and expensed portions of R&D investments are 
regarded differently by bond investors. While the amount of R&D capitalized during a year 
reduces the cost of public debt, the expensed component is not priced. Regarding the effect of 
R&D investments on the cost of private debt, we find that R&D costs of Expensers are not 
priced in syndicated loan deals. However, in line with our hypothesis, we find that the 
amount of capitalized R&D reduces syndicated loan prices for Capitalizers, whereas our 
results show no significant effect of the expensed component. These findings provide 
evidence that debt investors overall regard the capitalized part of R&D investments as a 
signal of reduced risk from R&D projects. This is consistent with the restrictive conditions in 
IAS 38, which are directed towards indications of likely success of firms’ capitalized 
development costs.  
In further analysis, we show that debt market participants are able to identify firms’ 
motives for R&D capitalization, as capitalized development costs are priced only for firms 
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whose capitalized amount is not attributed to earnings management incentives. Furthermore, 
for capitalizing firms we find that only the capitalized amount contributes to future earnings, 
while the expensed counterpart is not related to future benefits. In fact, the positive 
association between capitalized R&D and firms’ future earnings holds only for firms that do 
not show indications of employing R&D capitalization for earnings management reasons. 
Additionally, we document a significant positive relationship between R&D capitalization 
and a firm’s audit fees, implying that R&D capitalization as required by IAS 38 is a costly 
activity and so can be deemed to be a signaling device. Lastly, when we separate the amount 
of R&D that a firm capitalized during a year into expected and discretionary components, we 
show that it is the amount of R&D a firm is expected to capitalize, which facilitates a firm’s 
access to public debt markets, reduces bond and syndicated loan prices, and contributes to 
future benefits. 
We contribute to the literature firstly in adressing the call of Christensen et al. (2016, p. 
427) for future research by providing evidence of how “the choice among different 
accounting methods” facilitates debt contracting “when economic incentives to deliver an 
informative measure of the economic performance are present.” Bharath et al. (2008), 
Dhaliwal et al. (2011), Florou and Kosi (2015) and Ball et al. (2017) show that firms with 
lower information asymmetry exhibit a greater propensity for raising funds from public debt 
markets than private debt markets. Thus, our analysis indicates how a specific accounting 
treatment, which is at the heart of the accounting choice literature, is used to reduce 
information asymmetries to bondholders. Secondly, our study adds to recent literature by 
identifying R&D capitalization as a further mechanism that helps “to correct the potential 
misvaluation of firms’ R&D investments” (Zhang & Toffanin, 2018, p. 25). Our findings 
which demonstrate a positive association between development costs capitalized and future 
earnings as well as audit fees imply that R&D capitalization under IAS 38 is a costly, albeit 
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effective, signaling device for managers to convey private information about the future 
success of their R&D projects to debtholders. Thirdly, our investigations respond to the call 
for research on the value relevance of accounting numbers to debtholders (Holthausen & 
Watts, 2001; Givoly et al., 2017). Directly relevant to our research, Givoly et al. (2017, p. 69) 
state that “whether capitalization [of intangible assets] is beneficial to creditors is an open 
question.” Ours is the first study to show that capitalized development costs reduce the costs 
of both public and private debt.  
Beyond the academic contributions stemming from our analyses, the findings will 
present valuable information both for standard setters and regulators. For example, in 2018 
the UK’s Financial Reporting Council (FRC) initiated a project not only to review current 
requirements and practice for the business reporting of intangibles, but also subsequently to 
develop practical proposals for their improvement.1 In the feedback statement of its research 
agenda consultation the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) is also 
proposing research on this area in the near future.2 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant 
literature and hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the sample selection process and 
research design. Section 4 provides descriptive and multivariate analysis results. Section 5 
presents sensitivity tests and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 Debate about the accounting treatment of R&D 
Lev (2001) argues that R&D investments may enable firms to obtain a temporary monopoly 
in the market, allowing them to extract substantial future cash flows. Consistent with this, 
prior literature provides evidence that R&D-intensive firms in the US generate higher 





operating performance and growth (Chan et al., 2001; Eberhart et al., 2004). However, the 
success of R&D projects is by no means certain. Risks involved in R&D investments relate to 
the innovation process itself, which, compared with the standardized production process of 
tangible assets, often entails a long-term search for new processes or products, the occurrence 
of ill-structured problems and consequently a time-lag of unknown length before the project 
output is available (Dosi, 1988; Lev, 2001; Wyatt, 2005; Hunter et al., 2012). In the event of 
project failure, alternative fields for the use of R&D expenditures are scarce (Kothari et al., 
2002). Compared with capital expenditures, R&D investments are, therefore, more 
significantly associated with future earnings variability (Kothari et al., 2002), and stock 
returns volatility (Chan et al., 2001; Gharbi et al., 2014). These issues identified in prior 
research indicate that debate about the accounting treatment of R&D investments focuses on 
the associated future benefits and risks together with how to account for the trade-off. 
From a US GAAP perspective, the risk component outweighs future benefits: “The 
estimates of the rate of success of research and development projects vary markedly […] but 
all such estimates indicate a high failure rate” (Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
(SFAS) No. 2.39). On that basis, all R&D outlays must be expensed as incurred. Critics of 
this accounting treatment argue that mandatory expensing of R&D prevents managers from 
signaling future benefits of R&D projects, resulting in biased earnings and mispriced stock 
prices (Eberhart et al., 2004; Lev et al., 2005; Duqi et al., 2015). As R&D investments are 
found to be significantly associated with future earnings and market values (Stark & Thomas, 
1998; Shah et al., 2008; Duqi & Torluccio, 2013; see also discussion in the next sub-section), 
there are proponents of the view that some or all R&D investments should be treated as an 
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asset on a company’s balance sheet (Aboody & Lev, 1998; Lev & Zarowin, 1999; Lev, 
2004).3  
Under IFRS, R&D projects are separated into research and development phases (IAS 
38.52). Development costs must be capitalized if and only if, a firm is able to demonstrate all 
of the following: the technical feasibility of completing the intangible asset so that it will be 
available for use or sale; its intention to complete the intangible asset and its ability to use or 
sell it; a justification of how the intangible asset will generate future economic benefits; the 
availability of adequate technical, financial and other resources to complete the development 
of the intangible asset and to use or sell it; the ability to measure reliably the expenditure 
attributable to the intangible asset during its development (IAS 38.57).  
Capitalized development costs are, therefore, closer to being marketed or sold, and hence 
will more likely “generate probable future economic benefits” (IAS 38.58). In contrast, costs 
arising in the research phase or development expenditures, for which the restrictive 
conditions are not met, must be expensed as incurred, because in the case of those costs firms 
cannot demonstrate whether “probable future economic benefits” will be generated (IAS 
38.55, IAS 38.58)  
Upon meeting these conditions, capitalized development costs reflect proprietary firm 
information about R&D projects that are highly likely to succeed. However, to assess the 
fulfillment of these restrictive conditions, managers are required to exercise discretion, which 
creates opportunities for earnings management. Accordingly, as Oswald and Zarowin (2007) 
point out, it is ultimately an empirical question whether managers employ R&D capitalization 
to convey true signals about the success of R&D projects to capital market participants.  
 
                                                 
3 For a detailed literature review on the equity market implications of intangible assets in general and R&D in 
particular, see Stark (2008), Wyatt (2008) and Jeny and Moldovan (2018). 
9 
2.2 Capitalized development costs: future earnings, earnings management incentives 
and value relevance 
The only exception to the universal expensing of R&D in the US is SFAS No. 86, which 
allows the capitalization of software development (SD) costs only after technical feasibility is 
attained. Aboody and Lev (1998) report a positive relationship between the change in 
capitalized SD costs and the change in net income one year ahead and two years ahead. More 
recently, Wolfe (2012) investigates the relation between capitalized SD costs and future cash 
flows for US firms. She documents a much stronger association of future cash flows with 
capitalized SD costs compared with the expensed counterpart. These findings are consistent 
with the view that capitalized development costs indicate future benefits. 
In an Australian setting, prior to the convergence of Australian GAAP with IFRS, Wyatt 
(2005) shows that managers used the explicit accounting option to capitalize intangible assets 
under Australian GAAP predominantly for those assets that were associated with strong 
technological features. Also in an Australian setting, Ahmed and Falk (2009) provide 
evidence that expensed R&D costs as well as capital expenditures generate higher risk in 
future earnings than do discretionary capitalized R&D investments.  
Another strand of literature examined the value relevance of capitalized development 
costs, albeit exclusively for equity markets. For example, capitalized development costs are 
found to be positively associated with equity market values for Australian (Ahmed & Falk, 
2006; Ritter & Wells, 2006), Canadian (Callimaci & Landry, 2004) and UK firms (Oswald & 
Zarowin, 2007; Tsoligkas & Tsalavoutas, 2011; Shah et al., 2013). This evidence is mostly 
based on periods prior to the mandatory implementation of IFRS and lends support to the 
argument that markets perceive capitalized development costs as investments that genuinely 
represent future economic benefits.  
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Prior literature has attempted to shed light on the earnings management incentives 
associated with capitalization of development costs. For example, Wolfe (2012) reports that 
US firms which capitalize SD costs to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts have lower subsequent 
cash flows than Capitalizers whose capitalized SD costs are not attributed to benchmark 
beating incentives. In a French pre-IFRS setting, Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean (2006) report a 
negative relation between capitalized development costs and stock prices and returns, 
implying that investors are concerned about possible earnings management. In the same 
French pre-IFRS context, Cazavan-Jeny et al. (2011) provide evidence that capitalization of 
development costs is used to meet or beat earnings thresholds. They also find a negative or 
neutral impact of capitalized R&D on future performance. For a sample of Italian firms, prior 
to the adoption of IFRS in 2005, Markarian et al. (2008) show that R&D capitalization 
facilitates the smoothing of earnings.  
For German firms reporting under IFRS, Dinh et al. (2016) find that the amount of R&D 
a firm capitalized during a year is negatively associated with market values, consistent with 
the findings from Cazavan-Jeny and Jeanjean (2006) and the notion that earnings 
management may counteract the signaling value of R&D capitalization. However, for the 
sub-sample of observations where R&D capitalization is not suspected of being employed to 
meet or beat earnings thresholds, they find a positive relationship between capitalized 
development costs and market values. Dinh et al. (2016, p. 375) conclude that “market 
participants seem to be able to distinguish between the cases of earnings management and 
signaling”.  
Extant value relevance studies of R&D capitalization focus exclusively on the equity 
market, and consequently provide only a partial view of the market implications. Results 
from the equity market cannot be easily transferred to the debt market. Even though risks 
related to R&D projects impact both equity and debt investors, the effects are not the same. 
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Participants across the two markets have different payoff structures and thus react differently 
to accounting numbers (Lok & Richardson, 2011; DeFond & Zhang, 2014; Givoly et al., 
2017). As with equity investors, debtholders bear the full extent of downside risk (Ciftci & 
Darrough, 2016; Givoly et al., 2017). However, while equity investors can also benefit from 
the unlimited upside potential, debtholders’ returns are restricted to a fixed interest rate. 
Consequently, accounting information that may affect the downside risk is more relevant for 
debt investors than equity investors (Easton et al., 2009; Ciftci & Darrough 2016). According 
to Shi (2003) the debt market, therefore, provides a unique setting to investigate the 
fundamental question about the accounting treatment of R&D investments, as the tradeoff 
between the future benefits and risks of firms’ R&D investments is more distinct in debt 
markets than it is in equity markets. 
Although prior literature has provided some evidence as to the effect of R&D 
expenditure on debt markets (Shi, 2003; Eberhart et al., 2008; Ciftci & Darrough, 2016), 
these studies focus exclusively on companies reporting under US GAAP, which does not 
allow for any distinction between capitalized and expensed R&D costs. Thus, it remains an 
empirical question whether or not debt markets price the development costs capitalized and 
the research costs expensed under IFRS. This study provides evidence by testing the 
following hypotheses.  
 
2.3 Hypotheses development 
Traditionally, public debt markets held the advantage over private debt markets in that they 
could fund firms to a significant extent. However, recent growth in the private syndicated 
loan market has resulted in this becoming a more direct alternative source of funds (Altunbaş 
et al., 2010; Marshall et al., 2016). Thus, a firm’s decision to obtain direct financing via the 
public debt market or financing from banks through the private syndicated loan market 
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depends more on agency costs and asymmetric information issues rather than financial 
considerations (Bharath et al., 2008; Altunbaş et al., 2010; Marshall et al., 2016).  
In the case of syndicated loans, prior literature emphasizes the role of banks in 
monitoring and screening borrowers (Altunbaş et al., 2010). A syndicated loan is provided by 
several banks (typically up to eight), which have access to non-public information, such as 
management accounts, budgets and forecasts (Bharath et al., 2008; Florou & Kosi, 2015; 
Brown, 2016). This communication via private channels enables banks as private lenders to 
base their credit decisions on proprietary firm information (Florou & Kosi, 2015).  
By contrast, bondholders are a diffuse group of lenders, who, due to free-rider problems 
and duplication of monitoring costs, engage less in borrower monitoring (Gorton & Winton, 
2003). The relationship between borrower and bond investors is characterized by much larger 
levels of information asymmetry, compared with private lenders, as bondholders are less 
likely to have access to private information. This requires bond investors to rely heavily on 
public financial statements when assessing the default risk of corporate borrowers (Bharath et 
al., 2008; Florou & Kosi, 2015).  
Prior literature has found that large firms with lower degrees of information asymmetry 
show a higher propensity for accessing public debt markets (Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Marshall 
et al., 2016). In particular, the issuance of bonds is associated with large flotation costs, 
including bankers’ filing and legal fees (Bhagat & Frost, 1986; Blackwell & Kidwell, 1988), 
which limit smaller firms’ access to public debt markets (Krishnaswami et al., 1999; Bharath 
et al., 2008). As bondholders have no access to private information and are less likely to 
engage in monitoring borrowers and renegotiating contractual terms after initial issuance, 
they demand higher returns for risks generated by information asymmetries (Gorton & 
Winton, 2003; Altunbaş et al., 2010). In line with this, a broad stream of literature has found 
that firms with higher levels of information asymmetry exhibit a propensity for borrowing 
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funds from private debt markets. For instance, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) provide evidence that 
firms with higher levels of disclosure are more likely to access public debt markets than 
private debt markets. Similarly, Bharath et al. (2008) find that higher accounting quality is 
positively associated with the likelihood of accessing public debt markets rather than the 
syndicated loan market. Ball et al. (2017) show that following a cross-listing at a US 
exchange firms are more likely to issue bonds than to borrow privately, as the cross-listing 
increases the quality of a firm’s information environment. 
There are costs associated with the capitalization of development costs, which may 
influence companies’ decisions on capitalization. Firstly, R&D capitalization calls for firms 
to have elaborate internal management accounting systems in line with IAS 38 which 
requires them to demonstrate that they can distinguish between the research and 
development phases of R&D projects and provide evidence that the restrictive conditions for 
the amount of R&D capitalized are fulfilled (Dinh et al., 2016). Secondly, capitalizing R&D 
reveals to industry peers a firm’s expectation of future benefits from R&D investments. This, 
in turn, may increase industry competition with respect to R&D projects and therefore give 
rise to proprietary costs. Thirdly, R&D capitalization may lead to a loss of credibility in the 
event that the signaled expected benefits do not materialize. Fourthly, R&D capitalization 
significantly increases audit fees (Cheng et al., 2016; Kuo & Lee, 2017), as R&D 
capitalization requires auditors to conduct considerably more audit work (De George et al., 
2013; Cheng et al., 2016) or even to employ industry experts to determine whether or not 
capitalized R&D investments reflect underlying economic benefits (Cheng et al., 2016). 
In sum, we expect to find that firms which borrow funds from public debt markets rather 
than the syndicated loan market will capitalize higher amounts of R&D in order to decrease 
information asymmetries regarding the future success of their R&D investments. In contrast, 
firms that show a propensity for borrowing from the syndicated loan market are able to 
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communicate with banks over private channels and accordingly, from a cost-benefit 
perspective have fewer incentives to signal their future R&D benefits by capitalizing large 
amounts of development costs. Hence, we test the following hypothesis: 
H1: There is a positive association between the amount of R&D that firms capitalize 
during a year and firms’ propensity for borrowing funds from public debt markets 
rather than the syndicated loan market in the subsequent year.  
Focusing on public debt for US companies, Shi (2003) tests the effect of R&D intensity 
(measured as the ratio of R&D investments to market capitalization) on bond risk premium 
(bond ratings) and finds a positive association between R&D intensity and proxies for the 
cost of debt. Eberhart et al. (2008) argue that Shi’s (2003) results are driven by the 
measurement of R&D intensity because using market value as a denominator incorporates the 
market expectations of R&D investments. This inverts the true relationship between R&D 
intensity and the cost of public debt. Eberhart et al. (2008) scale R&D investments with sales 
or total assets and find that R&D investments reduce the cost of public debt. To corroborate 
their results, they document that R&D investments decrease firms’ default risk. 
In line with this evidence from the US for R&D investments (Eberhart et al. 2008), we 
expect that for firms expensing all of their R&D investments in a given year, there will be a 
negative association between these expenses and the cost of public debt. However, where 
firms capitalize some or all of their R&D expenditure during the year, we assume that the 
capitalized component fulfills the requisite conditions of IAS 38, thereby signaling R&D 
projects that will probably be successful. Thus, we expect that the amount of R&D which a 
firm capitalizes during a year is perceived by bondholders as a signal of reduced risk from 
R&D projects and hence positive future economic benefits. This would ultimately decrease 
bondholders’ downside risk. We, therefore, test the following hypothesis: 
H2: There is a negative association between the amount of R&D that firms capitalize 
during a year and firms’ cost of public debt. 
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Private lenders have access to proprietary firm information, such as budgets and detailed 
financial data, which potentially reduces the weight banks place on accounting numbers 
(Shivakumar, 2013). However, there is ample evidence that both the quality and credibility of 
financial statements is priced in bank loans (Bharath et al., 2008; Costello & Wittenberg-
Moerman, 2011; Anagnostopoulou, 2017). For example, Bharath et al. (2008) show that 
firms with higher accounting quality receive lower syndicated loan prices and favorable non-
price terms in syndicated loan contracts. Similarly, in an IFRS setting, Anagnostopoulou 
(2017) finds that accounting quality has a significant impact on the determination of loan 
prices for firms located in countries with stricter enforcement. The relevance of high 
accounting quality standards for banks is also evident in the study of Kim et al. (2011), who 
find that banks charge lower loan rates to IFRS adopters than to non-adopters. 
With regard to R&D investments and the cost of private debt in particular, Plumlee et al. 
(2015) document a negative association between loan spreads and the citation count on 
forthcoming patents for US firms. Using R&D intensity as a control variable, they report a 
significant negative association between R&D intensity and loan spreads. Interestingly, again 
for US firms, Ciftci and Darrough (2016) find a positive relationship between R&D 
investments and loan spreads.4 Ciftci and Darrough (2016) justify these results by focusing 
on smaller firms with more severe benefit-risk profiles. Accordingly, both results support the 
notion that banks price information reflecting future benefits from R&D expenditure under 
US GAAP. 
Considering the overall evidence that information in financial statements is priced in 
bank loans, we hypothesize that, in an IFRS setting, capitalized development costs would 
trigger loan investors to investigate firms’ R&D activities more closely. Additionally, 
                                                 
4 These different results in respect to the association between R&D investments and loan spreads may be 
attributable to sample differences in the two studies. While Plumlee et al. (2015) include firms only from R&D- 
intensive industries, Ciftci and Darrough (2016) do not apply a specific focus. Industry selection seems to play 
at least some role, as Ciftci and Darrough (2016) show that their results hold only for the sub-sample of firms 
which operate in industries with weak legal protection. 
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knowing that banks have access to non-public information, managers may be less inclined to 
capitalize R&D for opportunistic reasons. Consistent with this, Kim et al. (2010) point out 
that firms move away from accruals manipulation into real earnings management so as to 
avoid violating covenant thresholds in private debt contracts. Thus, we hypothesize that, also 
in the syndicated loan market, the amount of capitalized R&D is perceived as a signal of 
succesful R&D projects. This would ultimately decrease banks’ downside risk. Hence, we 
test the following hypothesis: 
H3: There is a negative association between the amount of R&D that firms capitalize 
during a year and firms’ cost of private debt. 
 
3. Sample selection and research design 
3.1 Sample selection 
We start by focusing on countries that mandatorily adopted IFRS or fully converged their 
local GAAP with IFRS between 2005 and 2013, as this is reported on the IFRS Foundation 
website.5 We then use the Worldscope item “Accounting Standards Followed” (WC07536) 
and include from Worldscope only those companies reporting under IFRS or local standards. 
Bond and syndicated loan issues are obtained from Thomson Reuters Eikon Deal Screener 
(‘TR Eikon’) as follows. We collect corporate bond and syndicated loan issues three years 
after IFRS were adopted or local GAAP was fully converged with IFRS in a country. As we 
measure financial variables directly prior to the debt issue date (Ge & Liu, 2015; Liu & 
Magnan, 2016) and we also use the lag of some variables in our regressions, a lag of three 
years ensures that our regression models do not include any firm-specific controls from the 
first year of mandatory IFRS reporting when R&D costs could be misreported due to low 
familiarity with IFRS (Kvaal & Nobes, 2012; Mazzi et al., 2018). We exclude bonds with a 
floating rate note and perpetual bonds, as they behave more like equities (Bessembinder et 
                                                 
5 http://www.ifrs.org/use-around-the-world/use-of-ifrs-standards-by-jurisdiction/#profiles.  
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al., 2009). Furthermore, we retain only bonds and syndicated loans issued by public non-
financial firms (e.g. De Franco et al., 2017). To match bond issues from TR Eikon with firms 
covered by Worldscope we use several identifiers (Bond ISIN, issuer ticker, ticker symbol) 
and company name as matching criteria (Florou & Kosi, 2015; Anagnostopoulou, 2017). For 
syndicated loans, we rely on ticker symbol and company name as matching criteria, because 
these are the only possible company identifiers to match syndicated loans to firms covered by 
Worldscope (Florou & Kosi, 2015; Anagnostopoulou, 2017). Debt issues are included only 
when the issuing firm either reported an R&D asset and/or R&D expenses at the fiscal year-
end directly prior to the debt issue date.6 This ensures that we have in our sample only those 
firms with current R&D activity. Firms from the Oil and Gas industry are excluded, since 
Worldscope may classify extraction costs as capitalized development costs (Mazzi et al., 
2018).  
We then identify firms as possibly capitalizing some of their R&D investments during a 
year when they either reported an R&D asset and/or an amortization of this asset directly 
prior to the debt issue date. As our main variable of interest, the amount of R&D a firm 
capitalized during a year, cannot be directly collected from Datastream, we follow Mazzi et 
al. (2018) and calculate the amount of R&D a firm capitalized in the fiscal year directly prior 
to the debt issue date as follows: R&D Assett0 (WC02504) – R&D Assett-1 (WC02504) + 
Amortization of R&D assett0 (WC01153). Given that in more than 70% of capitalizing firms 
one of these items was missing, we hand-collected the relevant data from the companies’ 
annual reports. However, during this hand-collection process, 453 debt issues were 
eliminated for several reasons, key among them being the publication of a large number of 
                                                 
6 To identify whether a firm reports R&D expenses and/or an R&D asset, we use Worldscope items “Research 
& Development” (WC01201) and “Net Development Costs” (WC02504). 
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Chinese firms’ annual reports solely in the local language.7 We excluded firms with missing 
data on financial, issue and country-specific variables. As the issuance of bonds serves as a 
long-term financing source, we excluded all bond issues with a maturity of less than 12 
months. This resulted in a total sample of 3,037 debt issues, of which 2,201 are bonds and 
836 are loans.8  
To test the relationship between the capitalized amount of R&D and a firm’s propensity 
to borrow funds from public debt markets rather than the syndicated loan market, in line with 
prior literature (Florou & Kosi, 2015; Ball et al., 2017), we included only one bond and/or 
syndicated loan per firm-year. Accordingly, we deleted multiple bond issues by the same firm 
within the same year and applied the same procedure for syndicated loans. In addition, we 
included only countries with more than ten observations, which resulted in a sample of 1,554 
debt issues for this analysis. Of those, 519 debt issues are from firms capitalizing some 
amount of their R&D investments during the fiscal year directly prior to the debt issue date 
(‘Capitalizers’). By contrast, 1,035 debt issues are from firms expensing all of their R&D 
investments during the fiscal year directly prior to the debt issue date (‘Expensers’).  
To test the effect of capitalized R&D on the price terms of bonds and syndicated loans, 
we followed prior research and performed this analysis on an issue-level (Bharath et al., 
2008; Florou & Kosi, 2015; De Franco et al., 2017). Consequently, we retained all bonds and 
syndicated loans a firm issued in a year, as debt issues differ in their contractual terms, for 
instance in price, borrowed amount, maturity and special features. We deleted bonds with a 
negative cost of debt and, both for the bond and syndicated loan sample, again included only 
countries with more than ten observations. Our final sample for the cost of public debt 
                                                 
7 All other annual reports were available in English and in the local language, allowing us to capture the relevant 
data. Other reasons for the exclusion of some observations related to misclassifications by Worldscope. For 
instance, when Worldscope classified acquired rights or trademarks related to R&D (e.g. patents, marketing 
rights) as capitalized development costs or when the capitalized amount of R&D did not stem from the 
capitalization of internal R&D investments but resulted from the recognition of in-process R&D projects 
acquired separately or in a business combination. 
8 All excluded bonds with a maturity of less than 12 months were issued by firms from China. 
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consists of 1,866 bond issues, of which 629 issues are from capitalizing firms and 1,237 are 
from expensing firms. Regarding the cost of private debt, we have a final sample of 722 
syndicated loans, of which 333 are obtained by R&D capitalizing firms and 389 by firms 
expensing all their R&D investments. Table 1 summarizes the sample selection process for 
analyzing our three hypotheses. Panel A shows the sample selection process for analyzing 
firms’ choice of source of debt financing, Panel B for analyzing firms’ cost of public debt and 
Panel C for analyzing firms’ cost of private debt. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
Table 2 shows our sample composition by country for the choice of source of debt 
financing and cost of debt samples. SuppInfo_I and SuppInfo_II break down the two samples 
by country and year (the latter can be accessed online in a separate file on the Journal’s 
website). 
The information in Table 2 indicates that our sample is dominated by firms from China, 
France, the UK and Germany. While firms from the latter three countries are predominant in 
both bond and syndicated loan samples, we find that Chinese firms are far more represented 
in the bond sample (482 bonds to 28 syndicated loans by Chinese firms; see Table 2 and 
SuppInfo_II). We find a good distribution of Capitalizerers and Expensers in the syndicated 
loan sample. The bond sample, however, consists of more Expensers than Capitalizers. This 
is primarily attributable to a much higher number of Expensers from China (19 Capitalizers 
vs. 463 Expensers; see Table 2).9 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
                                                 
9 This imbalance resulted from the exclusion of 376 bonds from Chinese firms during our sample selection 
process. According to Datastream, these excluded firms reported an R&D asset, indicating that they are R&D 
active and presumably capitalized R&D in a year. However, their annual report was only available in Chinese. 
For this reason, we were unable to verify the exact amount capitalized and excluded these observations. 
20 
3.2 Empirical specifications 
3.2.1 Determinants of amount of capitalized development costs  
The restrictive conditions in IAS 38 require managerial judgement to differentiate between 
R&D investments that should be capitalized and those that should be expensed. This 
discretionary element causes an endogeneity problem, which might bias the association 
between the amount of capitalized R&D and a firm’s debt financing choice (H1), as well as 
the effect of capitalized R&D on a firm’s cost of debt (H2 and H3) (Oswald, 2008; Cazavan-
Jeny et al., 2011). To mitigate this concern, in line with prior studies (e.g., Ciftci, 2010; Dinh 
et al., 2016), we supplemented our analysis with estimates of a two-stage-model (2SLS) when 
we tested our hypotheses. The latter involves first the identification of possible instrumental 
variables that are associated with the amount of R&D a firm capitalizes during a year.  
Accordingly, we first examined factors that prior literature has found to be related with 
the amount of capitalized R&D by estimating equation (1) as a zero (i.e. left) censored Tobit 
model (Markarian et al., 2008; Dinh et al., 2016; Mazzi et al., 2018). Based on the results 
from estimating equation (1), we then selected variables that are significantly related to the 
amount of R&D a firm capitalizes in a year. These variables were employed as instrumental 
variables in a first stage regression to calculate fitted values for RDCap when testing our 
hypotheses.10 
RDCapt   = b0 + ∑biFirm-Specific controlsi,t + ∑bi Country-Specific 
controlsi,t + ∑bi Industry fixed effectsi,t +∑bi Year fixed effectsi,t 
+ ei,t 
(1) 
where RDCap is the amount of R&D investments a firm capitalizes during year t divided by 
sales. Details on the rationale and theoretical justifications for the inclusion of the control 
variables can be found in Wyatt (2005), Markarian et al. (2008), Oswald (2008), Cazavan-
Jeny et al. (2011), Dinh et al. (2015), Dinh et al. (2016) and Mazzi et al. (2018). We report 
                                                 
10 Following Larcker and Rusticus (2010) and Schultze et al. (2017), the first stage regression to estimate the 
fitted values of RDCap includes both the selected instruments from equation (1) and all the independent 
variables from the specific model used to test our respective hypotheses. 
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details on the variables employed in all our regressions, together with their sources, in 
Appendix I. Appendix II shows the results for this analysis.11 
3.2.2 Hypothesis 1 – Development costs capitalized and the choice of source of debt 
financing 
In order to test the relationship between capitalized R&D and a firm’s choice of source of 
debt financing, we estimated the following two empirical models. They differ only in 
measurement of the dependent variable. Details on the rationale and theoretical justifications 
for the inclusion of the control variables can be found in Denis and Mihov (2003), Bharath et 
al. (2008), Dhaliwal et al. (2011), Florou and Kosi (2015), Marshall et al. (2016) and Ball et 
al. (2017). 
Bond_Issuet+1 = b0 + b1 RDCapt + b2 RDExpt + ∑biFirm-Specific controlsi,t + ∑biIssue-
Specific controlsi,t+1 + ∑bi Country-Specific controlsi,t + ∑bi Industry 
fixed effectsi,t +∑bi Year fixed effectsi,t + ei,t 
(2) 
%_of_Bond_Debtt+1 = b0 + b1 RDCapt + b2 RDExpt + ∑biFirm-Specific controlsi,t + 
∑biIssue-Specific controlsi,t+1 + ∑bi Country-Specific 
controlsi,t + ∑bi Industry fixed effectsi,t +∑bi Year fixed 
effectsi,t + ei,t 
(3) 
For estimating equation (2), in line with Florou and Kosi (2015) and Ball et al. (2017), we 
generated the dummy variable Bond_Issue, which equals one if a debt issue is a bond issue, 
and zero otherwise, and then ran a probit model on the total sample of bonds and loans (i.e. 
1,554 observations). It should be noted that when a firm issues both bonds and syndicated 
loans in a given year, we included the firm twice in that specific year: once with the 
dependent variable Bond_Issue equal to one (for a bond issue) and once with Bond_Issue 
equal to zero (for a syndicated loan issue) (Florou & Kosi, 2015, p. 1426). 
In line with Florou and Kosi (2015), in equation (3), the dependent variable is the 
continuous variable %_of_Bond_Debt, which is calculated for each firm-year. This equals the 
                                                 
11 We do not discuss results for estimating equation (1) in detail later on, as this analysis serves primarily for the 
identifaction of valid instrumental variables. Recent literature already provides evidence on the determinants of 
amounts of development costs capitalized under IFRS (Dinh et al., 2016; Mazzi et al., 2018). 
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ratio of the total amount of borrowed public debt to the total amount of borrowed debt (bonds 
and syndicated loans). Thus, the dependent variable ranges from zero (i.e. a firm borrows 
only from the private syndicated loan market in a particular year) to one (i.e. a firm issues 
only bonds in a particular year). On that basis, we tested the association between the amount 
of R&D a firm capitalized in a year and its choice of source of debt financing by running an 
OLS estimation on 1,455 firm-years.  
RDCap is the amount of R&D investments a firm capitalized in a year. RDExp is the 
amount of R&D investments a firm expensed in a year. Effectively, our first hypothesis 
predicts a positive b1 in equations (2) and (3). We tested this relation first for the full sample, 
including both Capitalizers and Expensers, and present results for the observed and, to 
control for endogeneity, for the fitted values of RDCap resulting from the IV Probit/2SLS 
estimation.12 Based on Chaney et al. (2004) and Chen et al. (2017), we also estimated 
equations (2) and (3) separately for Expensers and Capitalizers. This helps us mitigate 
concerns that our results are driven by sample heterogeneity, as prior studies (and our 
descriptive statistics later on) point out that expensing and capitalizing firms differ strongly 
within various firm and country-specific characteristics (Oswald & Zarowin, 2007; Oswald, 
2008; Cazavan-Jeny et al., 2011; Dinh et al., 2016; Mazzi et al., 2018). 
3.2.3 Hypotheses 2 & 3 – R&D Capitalization and the cost of debt 
In order to test the relationship between capitalized R&D and a firm’s cost of public (H2) and 
private debt (H3), we estimated the following empirical model separately for firms accessing 
the public debt market and for firms borrowing funds from the syndicated loan market. 
Details on the rationale and theoretical justifications for the inclusion of the control variables 
in relation to the cost of public debt can be found in Bharath et al. (2008), Eberhart et al. 
                                                 
12 As in equation (2) the dependent variable is a dummy variable, we, in line with prior literature (e.g. Campello 
et al., 2011), estimate equation (2) by an endogenous probit model (IV Probit)). More specifically, this model is 
similar to a 2SLS estimation; however, for the second stage a probit model instead of an OLS model is 
estimated. For more information on the implementation of such models see Finlay and Magnusson (2009). 
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(2008), Florou and Kosi (2015), Ge and Liu (2015), Franco et al. (2016) and Ball et al. 
(2017). Details in relation to control variables for the cost of syndicated loans can be found in 
Bharath et al., (2008), Florou and Kosi (2015), Anagnostopolou (2016), Ciftci & Darrough 
(2016), Brown (2016), Franco et al. (2016) and De Franco et al. (2017). 
Cost of debtt+1 = b0 + b2 RDCap + b3 RDExp + ∑biFirm-Specific controlsi,t + ∑bi Issue-
Specific controlsi,t+1 + ∑bi Country-Specific controlsi,t+1 + ∑bi 
Industry fixed effectsi,t +∑bi Year fixed effectsi,t + ei,t 
(4) 
We followed prior literature (e.g., Shi, 2003; Eberhart et al., 2008; Florou & Kosi, 2015; 
Ciftci & Darrough, 2016; Francis et al., 2017; De Franco et al., 2017) in estimating equation 
(4) at an issue-level. Accordingly, we included all bonds and syndicated loans a firm issued 
within a year, as debt issues differ in their contractual terms. Regarding the cost of debt for 
firms accessing the public debt market, we defined Cost_of_debt as the difference in basis 
points (bp) between the yield to maturity of a corporate bond at issue date and the interest 
yield of a treasury security (T-bill) issued by the same country, at the same date and with 
comparable maturity to the corporate bond (Eberhart et al., 2008; Bharath et al., 2008; Florou 
& Kosi, 2015).13 When estimating equation (4) for syndicated loans, we defined 
Cost_of_debt as the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR or LIBOR 
equivalent for each dollar drawn (Bharath et al., 2008; Ciftci & Darrough, 2016; Franco et al., 
2016).  
Similarly to equations (2) and (3), RDCap is the capitalized amount of R&D investments 
and RDExp represents the expensed R&D investments. Thus, we first estimated equation (4) 
for the full sample, including both Capitalizers and Expensers, and present results for the 
actual and, to control for endogeneity, for the fitted values of RDCap resulting from the 2SLS 
                                                 
13 In case the interest yield of a treasury bond is not available, we follow Shi (2003) and Ge and Liu (2015) and 
make use of an interpolation approach to construct it. For example, when we only have treasury securities with 
maturities of four and six years and the corporate bond has a maturity of five years, we add the interest yield of 
the treasury security of four years to the interest yield of the treasury security with a maturity of six years and 
divide it by two. To make sure that our results are not driven by any wrong matching of corporate bonds and 
treasury securities, we exclude all issues where the matching results in negative cost of debt and additionally we 
winsorize the cost of debt for bonds at the top and bottom 5 percentiles. 
24 
estimation. In the spirit of Chaney et al. (2004) and in line with Chen et al. (2017), we then 
estimated equation (4) separately for Capitalizers and Expensers. This helps us alleviate 
concerns that differences in firm and country characteristics between Capitalizers and 
Expensers may obfuscate a significant relationship between capitalized R&D and a firm’s 
cost of debt. Separating the sample into Capitalizers and Expensers also increases the level of 
information we were able to derive from our results, as it enables us to investigate whether 
debt investors specifically differentiate between the capitalized (b2) and expensed (b3) R&D 
components of capitalizing firms. 
In all equations, we added industry dummy variables based on ICB industry level 1. We 
controlled for cross-sectional and time series correlations by including year fixed effects and 
clustering by firm (Petersen, 2009). Following Oswald (2008), Cazavan-Jeny et al. (2011) 
and Dinh et al. (2016), all variables were adjusted to values before R&D capitalization. We 
winsorized all continuous variables at the 1% level on both tails of the distribution. As 
discussed earlier, Appendix I summarizes all variables’ descriptions, including their sources. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 3 shows descriptive results for the dependent and independent variables 
used in multivariate analyses for the full sample, while Panel B of Table 3 reports differences 
between companies that capitalize some or all of their R&D expenditures (Capitalizers) and 
those that expense all their R&D costs (Expensers).  
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
For our full sample, we find that, on average, firms invest 2.5% of their sales into R&D 
(RD_Intensity), which corresponds to the average R&D intensity of the European Union 
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(2.1%) and OECD countries (2.38%).14 Comparing R&D intensity between Capitalizers and 
Expensers, Table 3 Panel B shows a higher R&D intensity for capitalizing firms compared to 
expensing firms. While Capitalizers report a mean (median) R&D intensity of 3.5% (2.2%), 
Expensers show a mean (median) R&D intensity of 2.0% (0.9%). The T-Test (Mann-
Whitney test) indicates that there is a strong statistically significant difference across the two 
groups. Splitting the R&D intensity of capitalizing firms into the capitalized and expensed 
categories, we find that, on average, the capitalized amount of R&D during the year accounts 
for 0.9% of sales (RDCap), while the expensed amount is around 2.6% of sales (RDExp). 
Comparing these ratios to those reported in previous literature, we find nearly the same 
results in the study of Dinh et al. (2016, p. 385), who document for German capitalizing firms 
a ratio of 0.8% (2.8%) for the amount of R&D a firm capitalized (expensed) during a year. 
In terms of issue-specific variables, expensing firms both access the public debt market 
more frequently (mean Bond_Issue = 0.615 for Capitalizers vs. mean Bond_Issue = 0.742 for 
Expensers) and borrow more funds from the public debt market than Capitalizers (mean 
%_of_Bond_Debt = 0.626 for Capitalizers vs. mean %_of_Bond_Debt = 0.787 for 
Expensers). T-test and Mann-Whitney test indicate no difference in bond prices for 
Capitalizers and Expensers. In contrast, Expensers seem to be favored by banks, as, based on 
medians only, they pay lower prices for syndicated loans than Capitalizers (median 
Cost_of_debt (in bp) = 200.00 for Capitalizers vs. mean Cost_of_debt (in bp) = 170.00 for 
Expensers). Thus, these descriptive statistics provide no support for our hypotheses. These 
statistics, however, do not control for firm and country-specific factors affecting both a firm’s 
choice of source of debt financing and cost of debt. Further, they do not take into account 
other contractual terms of debt agreements, which may have an influence on a firm’s 
financing decisions and borrowing costs. For instance, we find that Capitalizers are able to 
                                                 
14 R&D intensity data for the European Union and for OECD countries is retrieved from the OECD main 
science and technology indicator database. 
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issue bonds of larger amounts (mean Debt_Amount (in mil. USD) = 461.28 for Capitalizers 
vs. Debt_Amount (in mil. USD) = 416.075 for Expensers) and bonds with longer maturity 
(mean Maturity (in months) = 82.327 for Capitalizers vs. mean Maturity (in months) = 
73.611 for Expensers).   
Regarding firm-specific characteristics, we find substantial differences between 
Capitalizers and Expensers. In line with prior literature (Dinh et al., 2016; Mazzi et al., 2018), 
R&D capitalization seems to be associated with real and accounting earnings management. 
Firstly, more Capitalizers than Expensers report lower total R&D expenditures in the current 
year compared to the previous year (mean Cut_RD for Capitalizers = 0.344 vs. mean Cut_RD 
for Expensers = 0.283), indicating that some Capitalizers in our sample employ both real 
earnings management (i.e., cutting total R&D expenditures) and accruals earnings 
management (i.e., capitalizing R&D) simultaneously, as both methods increase a firm’s 
reported income. Secondly, Capitalizers seem to make use of discretion in the capitalization 
of R&D to beat earnings benchmarks, as we find significant differences between the two 
groups for all three benchmark beating proxies. We note that Expensers and Capitalizers 
differ in the proxy for the success of a firm’s R&D program (mean RD_Value for Capitalizers 
= 75.515 vs. mean RD_Value for Expensers = 218.427). Additionally, consistent with results 
from Dinh et al. (2016), the T-test and Mann-Whitney test show that capitalizing firms are 
larger, but less profitable (mean ROA = 0.061 for Capitalizers vs. mean ROA = 0.071 for 
Expensers). Also, they report less tangible assets on their balance sheet than Expensers (mean 
Tangibility = 0.242 for Capitalizers vs. mean Tangibility = 0.323 for Expensers). A 
capitalizing firm’s debt issue is more likely to be rated (mean Rated = 0.399 for Capitalizers 
vs. mean Rated = 0.252 for Expensers). However, Capitalizers are less likely to have an 
investment-grade rating and consequently also carry higher default risk compared with 
Expensers (mean O_Score = -3.838 for Capitalizers vs. mean O_Score = -4.228 for 
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Expensers). Consequently, firm-level characteristics show a strong heterogeneity between 
Capitalizers and Expensers. In particular, Capitalizers seem to suffer from higher information 
asymmetry levels compared with Expensers, as they are less profitable, have a higher default 
risk, and invest more in R&D than in tangible assets. However, we also note that Capitalizers 
exhibit higher future operating earnings (mean NI = 0.804 for Capitalizers vs. mean NI = 
0.644 for Expensers), indicating that capitalized R&D translates into future benefits. We find 
that Capitalizers pay higher audit fees than Expensers (mean log(Fees) = 8.377 for 
Capitalizers vs. mean log(Fees) = 7.250 for Expensers), which is in line with prior literature, 
indicating that R&D capitalization is associated with higher audit fees (Cheng et al., 2016; 
Kuo & Lee, 2017) and can therefore be deemed to be a signaling device.15 
We next investigate whether or not differences between Capitalizers and Expensers are 
also reflected in country-specific characteristics. Findings show that Capitalizers are 
predominantly from countries with higher exchange rate volatility (mean Exchange_Risk = 
0.040 for Capitalizers vs. mean Exchange_Risk = 0.033 for Expensers), higher economic 
uncertainty (mean Term_Spread = 1.504 for Capitalizers vs. mean Term_Spread = 1.165 for 
Expensers) and higher default risk.16 However, driven presumably by the high number of 
Chinese Expensers compared with Capitalizers in our sample, we also note that Capitalizers 
operate in countries with stronger enforcement bodies (mean Enforcement = 44.307 for 
Capitalizers vs. mean Enforcement = 41.554 for Expensers), lower levels of corruption (mean 
Corruption = 2.791 for Capitalizers vs. mean Corruption = 3.833 for Expensers) and slower-
growing economies (mean GDP_Growth = 1.352 for Capitalizers vs. mean GDP_Growth = 
4.011 for Expensers).  
                                                 
15 Variables for future profitability (NI) and audit fees (log(Fees)) are presented for a lower number of 
observations (i.e., 1,054 and 1,243). Relevant data were not available for all observations in our sample. 
16 Note that we are able to measure a firm’s country of domicile’s exchange rate volatility (Exchange_Risk), 
economic uncertainty (Term_Spread) and probability of default (Country_PoD) at the month and year a debt 
security is issued. As firms can issue multiple bonds and syndicated loans in a year, we present these country 
variables for each bond and syndicated loan issued (issue-level) and thus for a larger number of observations 
than common firm-level controls. 
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We report significant differences between public and private borrowers in Appendix III. 
Firm-specific characteristics reveal that borrowers from the public debt market are larger 
firms with more tangible assets and a higher leverage ratio. The public debt market enables 
firms to borrow debt with longer maturities, while the syndicated loan market offers 
opportunities for borrowing larger debt amounts. These results are consistent with prior 
literature (e.g., Altunbaş et al., 2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Florou & Kosi, 2015, Marshall et 
al. 2016). 
 
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
4.2.1 Choice of source of debt financing (H1) 
Table 4 reports results regarding an association between the amount of R&D a firm 
capitalized during a year and a firm’s propensity to borrow funds from the public debt market 
rather than the syndicated loan market. While models 1 to 4 correspond to equation (2) with 
Bond_Issue as the dependent variable, models 5 to 8 document OLS and 2SLS results of 
equation (3) with the continuous variable %_of_Bond_Debt as the dependent variable.  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
For model 1, we find a positive association between capitalized R&D and a firm’s propensity 
to issue bonds (the coefficient for RDCap is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level), indicating that firms capitalize larger amounts of R&D as a means of facilitating 
access to public debt markets. In model 2, we control for endogeneity using fitted values of 
RDCap, which are calculated by a first stage regression.17 For the selection of relevant 
instrumental variables for this first stage regression, we relied on firm-specific factors that are 
found to drive the amount of R&D capitalized (see Appendix II). Accordingly, we selected a 
firm’s default risk (O_Score), profitability (ROA) and earnings management incentives 
                                                 
17 The first stage regression includes selected instrumental variables from equation (1) and all independent 
variables, except RDCap, from equation (2). 
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(Cut_RD and Beat_Bench) as instrumental variables.18 Additionally, we selected 
RD_Intensity and RD_Value as instrumental variables, since descriptive statistics (compare 
Table 3 Panel B) suggest a strong difference between Capitalizers and Expensers for these 
R&D related variables. To evaluate the appropriateness of our instrumental variables, we 
follow Florou and Kosi (2015) and Schultze et al. (2017) and report weak instruments and 
over-identifying restriction tests, both suggesting that our instruments are valid.19 Consistent 
with H1, also in model 2, we find a positive association between capitalized R&D and a 
firm’s propensity to borrow funds from public debt markets (the coefficient for RDCap is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level). Estimating equation (2) separately for 
Capitalizers (model 3) and Expensers (model 4) corroborates our results for the full sample, 
indicating that Capitalizers employ R&D capitalization as a means of facilitating access to 
public debt markets (the coefficient for RDCap is positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level in model 3). By contrast, the coefficient of RDExp is not significant in model 4. 
In models 5 to 8, we repeat our analyses with %_of_Bond_Debt as the dependent 
variable. While model 5 is estimated by OLS, we employ 2SLS estimates in model 6, using 
the same instrumental variables as before. In models 7 and 8, we report results when equation 
(3) is estimated separately for Capitalizers and Expensers. Under all specifications, we find 
that firms capitalize larger amounts of R&D when they exhibit a propensity to issue bonds 
rather than to borrow funds from the syndicated loan market (the corresponding coefficients 
for RDCap are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level). 
                                                 
18 Results in Appendix II suggest that the variables log(Size), MTB and GDP_Growth are also significantly 
associated with the amount of R&D a firm capitalized during a year. Following prior literature (Larcker & 
Rusticus, 2010; Lennox et al., 2012), we do not select them as instrumental variables, since they are already 
included as control variables in equation (2). In line with Larcker and Rusticus (2010), we do not employ lagged 
values of the endogenous regressor (i.e. in our case Lag_RDCap) as an instrumental variable.  
19 Table 4 model 2 documents the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic as a test of weak identification and 
Hansen’s J-statistic as a test of overidentification. Under the first test, we obtain a test statistic value of 22.797, 
which exceeds the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical value of 11.12, indicating that our instruments are not weak. 
For the Hansen J-statistic we find a value of 4.077 (p > 0.10), which shows that our instruments are not partially 
endogenous. 
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Models 1, 2, 5 and 6 indicate that Capitalizers in general prefer to access the private 
syndicated loan market rather than the public debt market (the corresponding coefficients for 
the dummy variable CAP are negative and statistically significant at the 5% level). This 
corroborates our prior findings, implying that Capitalizers and Expensers constitute two 
substantially different groups of companies. Capitalizers, as suggested by both descriptive 
statistics (Table 3 Panel B) and results for the determinants for R&D capitalization 
(Appendix II), suffer from higher levels of information asymmetry compared with Expensers 
and may therefore prefer borrowing debt in syndicated loan markets. However, when 
Capitalizers plan to access the public debt market, they capitalize larger amounts of 
development costs to decrease information asymmetry levels to bond investors. 
Results regarding firm and country-specific variables are in line with prior literature 
(Florou & Kosi, 2015; Marshall et al. (2016), Ball et al., 2017), indicating that firms with 
lower levels of information asymmetry are more likely to borrow funds from public debt 
markets than private debt markets.  
4.2.2 Effect of capitalized R&D on the cost of public and private debt (H2 & H3) 
Table 5 shows our results for the relationship between capitalized R&D and the cost of public 
debt. Similar to Table 4, model 1 of Table 5 reports findings using OLS, while model 2 
controls for endogeneity by documenting 2SLS estimates.20 While RDCap has, as expected, a 
negative sign, its coefficient is insignificant in both models. Prior descriptive statistics, as 
well as regression results from estimating equations (1), (2) and (3), however, show that 
Capitalizers and Expensers are two different groups of companies, which vary widely in 
                                                 
20 Fitted values for RDCap in model 2 are again calculated by a first stage regression, including both selected 
instrumental variables from equation (1) and all independent variables, except RDCap, from equation (4). As 
instrumental variables, we select RD_Intensity, RD_Value, O_Score, Beat_Bench, Cut_RD and GDP_Growth. 
As reported by Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic and Hansen’s J-statistic, our instruments are appropriate, i.e. 
neither weak nor partially endogenous (see Table 5 model 2). We apply the same procedure and include the 
same instrumental variables (except for O_Score, as this variable is not associated with the amount of R&D 
capitalized for firms accessing the syndicated loan market (Appendix II, models 5 and 6)) to obtain fitted values 
for RDCap for analyzing firms’ cost of private debt. Also for this analysis instruments can be considered valid 
(see Table 6, model 2).  
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nearly all firm and country-specific characteristics. Thus, the true relationship between R&D 
investments of IFRS reporting firms and their cost of debt may be obfuscated by the strong 
differences between the two groups of companies. Accordingly, we follow Chen et al. (2017) 
and estimate equation 4 separately for Expensers (model 3) and Capitalizers (model 4). 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Partitioning the sample reveals findings consistent with our hypotheses. As model 4 suggests, 
bond investors do value the capitalized and expensed R&D costs for Capitalizers differently. 
In line with theoretical considerations and our hypothesis, bondholders regard only the 
capitalized part as valuable, resulting in a negative association between capitalized R&D and 
the cost of public debt in model 4 (the coefficient for RDCap is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% level). In contrast, the expensed counterpart is not priced by bond 
investors, indicated by the positive and insignificant coefficient of RDExp in model 4.  
Models 3 and 4 reveal that the coefficient of RDExp for the full sample (models 1 and 2) 
is insignificant, as bondholders price the expensed R&D investments of Expensers and 
Capitalizers differently. Consistent with results from Eberhart et al. (2008) for US firms, 
R&D costs of Expensers are regarded as valuable, leading to a reduction in the cost of public 
debt (the coefficient for RDExp is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level). 
Results with respect to firm, issue- and country-specific control variables are in line with 
prior literature (Eberhart et al., 2008; Liu & Magnan, 2016; Ball et al., 2017).  
Table 6 documents results for testing the effect of capitalized R&D on the cost of private 
debt. Similar to the results regarding the cost of public debt, we first present results for the 
full sample, including 2SLS estimates to control for endogeneity in model 2. Models 3 and 4 
display findings when equation (4) is estimated separately for Capitalizers and Expensers. 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
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While we again find, for the full sample, a negative but insignificant coefficient for 
RDCap, model 4 in Table 6 shows results similar to the cost of public debt. In line with H3, 
we find for the sample of Capitalizers that capitalized R&D investments also reduce the cost 
of private debt (the coefficient for RDCap is negative and statistically significant at the 5% 
level). The expensed counterpart, though, similarly to the public debt market, is not priced in 
the syndicated loan market, implied by the positive and insignificant coefficient of RDExp in 
model 4. These results are consistent with our hypothesis and show a homogenous pricing of 
R&D investments for capitalizing firms in the syndicated loan market and public debt market. 
Contrary to the results on the cost of public debt, however, we find no significant effect for 
R&D investments of expensing firms on the cost of private debt.21  
4.2.3 Additional analysis – Signaling vs. Earnings Management  
The academic discussion about the accounting treatment for R&D under IFRS is inherently 
associated with signaling theory. Arguably, only when managers employ R&D capitalization 
to reveal truthfully proprietary firm information to investors, does capitalized R&D reflect 
succesful R&D projects (see discussion in sub-section 2.2 earlier). 
As shown earlier, earnings management incentives to capitalize development costs are 
also prevalent in our sample firms. Our prior results reveal in particular that significantly 
more Capitalizers than Expensers cut their R&D outlays, as both cutting R&D investments 
and capitalizing R&D increases earnings. Additionally, our results show that firms capitalize 
larger amounts of R&D investments when they are suspected of employing R&D 
capitalization as a means of beating earnings benchmarks. In line with the development of H2 
and H3, we expect that capitalized R&D reduces the cost of debt only when managers 
                                                 
21 Results from the US regarding the association between R&D investments and the cost of private debt are 
mixed, documenting both a significant positive (Ciftci & Darrough, 2016) and negative association (Plumlee et 
al., 2015). Under IFRS, R&D capitalization could trigger banks to investigate a firm’s R&D activities more 
closely, demanding private information, e.g. obtaining information with respect to forecasted future cash-flows 
for the capitalized and expensed parts of R&D investments. Under this assumption, capitalized R&D should 
only be priced in debt markets when it relates to true signals about the future success of R&D projects and not to 
managerial opportunism. We investigate this in the next sub-section. 
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employ R&D capitalization to convey genuine information about the future success of R&D 
projects to debt markets. 
On that basis and in the spirit of Dinh et al. (2016), we split the sample of Capitalizers 
into two groups, conditional on firms’ earnings management incentives. We assume that a 
capitalizing firm reveals truthful signals to public debt markets and syndicated loan markets 
when its capitalized amount of R&D is neither associated with real earnings management 
(Cut_RD) nor accounting earnings management incentives (Beat_Bench). Conversely, we 
suspect that a capitalizing firm will employ R&D capitalization opportunistically when its 
capitalized amount of R&D is either related to real (Cut_RD) or accounting earnings 
management (Beat_Bench).  
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
Table 7 displays results for the effect of capitalized R&D on the cost of public (models 1 and 
2) and private debt (models 3 and 4), conditional on firms’ earnings management incentives. 
As displayed in models 1 and 3, we find a reduction in the cost of public and private debt 
only when capitalized R&D is not attributed to earnings management incentives (the 
coefficient for RDCap is negative and statistically significant at the 1% (5%) level in model 1 
(model 3)). By contrast, where we suspect a firm’s R&D capitalization to be motivated by 
earnings management, capitalized R&D is not priced, implied by the insignificant coefficient 
of RDCap in models 2 and 4. 
 
4.2.4 Additional analysis – R&D capitalization and future benefits 
Our main results reveal that debt investors differentiate between the capitalized and expensed 
components of R&D expenditures when they price capitalizing firms. In particular, the 
amount of R&D a capitalizing firm expensed during a year is not priced, whilst the amount 
capitalized reduces the cost of debt. However, our results do not shed light on whether or not 
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capitalized development costs reflect managers’ private information about the future benefits 
of R&D investments.  
To analyze whether capitalizing firms’ R&D expenditures affect future benefits, we draw 
on Lev and Sougiannis (1996), who point out that earnings are a direct measure of the 
benefits associated with R&D.  
Firstly, as already documented by our descriptive statistics, R&D capitalization under 
IAS 38 may enable managers to convey private information about the future success of R&D 
expenditures, as Capitalizers show higher future earnings than Expensers (mean NI = 0.804 
for Capitalizers vs. mean NI = 0.644 for Expensers and the difference is significant at the 1% 
level; see Table 3 Panel B). 
Secondly, in the spirit of Lev and Sougiannis (1996), we examine the determinants of 
future earnings by conducting a multivariate analysis, focusing on their relation with 
capitalizing firms’ R&D investments.22 The dependent variable is NI (i.e., future earnings) 
and is measured as the sum of earnings from year t+1 to year t+3 scaled by the market value 
of equity (Mazzi et al., 2018). Earnings are defined as operating income plus R&D expense, 
depreciation and amortization (Lev & Sougiannis, 1996; Aboody & Lev, 1998; Mazzi et al., 
2018). In line with prior literature (Lev & Sougiannis, 1996; Amir et al., 2007; Mazzi et al., 
2018), we add back R&D expenditure, depreciation and amortization to avoid any 
mechanical association in earnings that may affect our inferences. 
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
Table 8 (model 1) reports results for the effect of capitalizing firms’ R&D investments 
on future earnings. While we find a significant positive association between the amount of 
                                                 
22 As previously, we include firm-specific and country-specific control variables as well as industry and year 
fixed effects. Descriptive statistics for all included variables are shown in Table 3 (Panels A and B). Also, we 
describe in detail all included variables in Appendix I. For further details on the rationale and theoretical 
justifications for the included firm and country controls, we refer to prior literature (Lev & Sougiannis, 1996; 
Aboody & Lev, 1998; Kothari et al., 2002; Amir et al., 2007; Ahmed & Falk, 2009; Cazavan-Jeny et al., 2011; 
Wolfe, 2012; Mazzi et al., 2018). 
35 
R&D a firm capitalized in a year and its future earnings (the coefficient for RDCap is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level), we find no such association for the 
expensed counterpart, documented by the insignificant coefficient of RDExp.  
In line with our analysis for the cost of debt, we next present results for the effect of 
capitalized R&D on future earnings conditional on a firm’s earnings management incentives 
in models 2 and 3 of Table 8. This analysis is again based on the premise that a capitalizing 
firm reveals truthful signals about the future success of its R&D investments when its 
capitalized amount of R&D is neither associated with real earnings management (Cut_RD) 
nor with accounting earnings management incentives (Beat_Bench).  
Confirming the earlier findings regarding the cost of debt, debt market participants are 
able to identify a firm’s motives for R&D capitalization. We find that capitalized 
development costs in a given year contribute to future earnings only when R&D 
capitalization is not associated with earnings management incentives (the coefficient for 
RDCap is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in model 2). By contrast, for 
the subsample where earnings management incentives are prevalent, we find no effect from 
the capitalized amount of R&D on future earnings, indicated by the insignificant coefficient 
of RDCap in model 3.  
In sum, results from this analysis imply that the capitalization of development costs, as 
required by IFRS, enables managers to convey private information about the future benefits 
of R&D projects to capital markets, which in turn allows debt investors to distinguish 
between successful and unsuccessful R&D projects. 
4.2.5 Additional analysis – R&D capitalization and audit fees 
The findings we reported earlier are based on the premise that managers accept the costs of 
development expenditures’ capitalization in order to use R&D capitalization (compared to 
full expensing of R&D) as a signaling device. In fact, for a signal to be informative there 
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needs to be costs involved (Dye, 1985). Costs associated with R&D capitalization can arise 
from different sources. While most are difficult to measure (e.g. increased management 
accounting costs or increased industry competition), audit fees can be directly observed.  
Prior literature suggests that R&D capitalization requires additional audit work to verify 
it. For example, De George et al. (2013) find that compliance with IAS 38 is positively 
related to audit fees as the complexity of auditing capitalized development costs involves 
high audit effort. Kuo and Lee (2017) show a significant positive association between audit 
fees and capitalized R&D for IFRS reporting firms across several countries for the period 
between 2005 and 2014. Cheng et al. (2016) report similar findings for Chinese firms for the 
sample period 2007-2013. 
We have already shown that Capitalizers pay significantly higher audit fees compared to 
Expensers (mean log(Fees) = 8.377 for Capitalizers vs. mean log(Fees) = 7.250 for 
Expensers and the difference is significant at the 1% level; see Table 3 Panel B). As a further 
test we follow Cheng et al. (2016) and Kuo & Lee (2017) and examine the determinants of 
audit fees, with a focus on the relation between R&D capitalization and audit fees.23 Table 9 
reports the results for the multivariate analysis. 
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
In following Cheng et al. (2016), we firstly conduct the multivariate analysis without the 
dummy variable CAP, which controls for the binary decision to capitalize R&D. Similarly to 
Cheng et al. (2016) and Kuo and Lee (2017), we find that the amount of R&D a firm 
capitalizes in a year (RDCap) is positively associated with audit fees (the coefficient for 
                                                 
23 As previously, we include firm-specific and country-specific control variables as well as industry and year 
fixed effects. Descriptive statistics for all included variables are shown in Table 3 (Panels A and B). For the 
details on the rationale and theoretical justifications for the included firm and country controls, we refer to prior 
literature (Cheng et al., 2016; Kuo & Lee, 2017). 
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RDCap is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in model 1).24 When we 
additionally control for the binary decision to capitalize R&D during a year (CAP) in model 
2, the coefficient of RDCap is no longer significant. Instead, we find that the firm-specific 
characteristic of being a Capitalizer is significant and highly positively associated with a 
firm’s audit fees (the coefficient for CAP is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level in model 2), implying that in general terms R&D capitalization can be deemed a costly 
signaling device. To substantiate our finding, we next exclude the capitalized (RDCap) and 
expensed amounts of R&D (RDExp) in model 3, but keep the dummy variable CAP. As 
model 3 shows, we still find a significant positive association between CAP and a firm’s audit 
fees (the coefficient for CAP is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in model 
3). 
All these results imply that as soon as a firm starts capitalizing development costs, audit 
fees increase. When a firm capitalizes some or all of its R&D investments during a year, 
additional audit work is required. Irrespective of the amount capitalized, R&D capitalization 
triggers auditors to evaluate whether a company fulfills all the conditions prescribed in IAS 
38 (e.g. whether the internal management accounting systems allows a firm to distinguish 
between the research and development phase of its R&D projects and whether the restrictive 
conditions to capitalize development costs are fulfilled) and whether the capitalized amount 
reflects economic substance. Thus, R&D capitalization increases audit fees and can, 
therefore, be regarded as a signaling device. 
                                                 
24 Given that in model 1 the test on endogeneity is significant, OLS estimates are biased and we, therefore, in 
line with Dinh et al. (2016), present 2SLS estimates for model 1 only. Fitted values for RDCap in model 1 are 
calculated by a first stage regression, including both selected instrumental variables from equation (1) and all 
independent variables, except RDCap, used to test the effect of R&D capitalization on audit fees (see Table 9). 
As instrumental variables, we select RD_Intensity, RD_Value, O_Score, Beat_Bench, Cut_RD and 
GDP_Growth. While the Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic shows that our instrumental variables are not weak 
(p < 0.01), we find for the Hansen J-statistic a value of 64.195 (p < 0.01). Thus, our instrumental variables may 
be partially endogenous and hence also our 2SLS estimates for model 1 may be biased. We, therefore, follow 
Schultze et al. (2017) and exclude instruments from the first stage regression that are not significant (RD_Value, 
O_Score, Cut_RD) as well as the country variable GDP_Growth. This reduces the Hansen J-statistic to a normal 
level of 1.115 (p > 0.10), indicating that our instruments now can be considered valid, while main inferences 
still hold. 
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4.2.6 Additional analysis – Expected and discretionary R&D capitalization 
Our previous results suggested that the amount of R&D a firm capitalizes in a year is valued 
positively by debt markets. However, given that R&D capitalization under IAS 38 requires 
managerial discretion, it is questionable whether there is any particular amount that debt 
market participants expect a firm to capitalize in a year. Put differently, through our research 
design we cannot rule out the possibility that firms gain access to public debt markets and 
receive favourable contract terms by capitalizing abnormal amounts of R&D. 
To address these concerns and shed more light on our main findings, we proceed as 
follows. Drawing on the discretionary accruals literature (Jones, 1991; Boynton et al., 1992; 
DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Francis et al., 2005), we perform an analysis intended to 
estimate both the amount of R&D a firm is expected to capitalize given its specific 
characteristics and the abnormal or, in the spirit of the accruals literature, “discretionary” 
amount of R&D a firm has capitalized during a given year. A similar approach, also in the 
context of capitalized R&D was recently applied by Cheng et al. (2016), Kuo and Lee (2017) 
and Mazzi et al. (2018). 
We rely on equation (1), which previously helped us to control for endogeneity, as it 
identifies factors that prior literature has found will determine the amount of R&D a firm 
capitalizes in a year. By estimating equation (1) as a left-censored Tobit model, we receive 
the fitted values (i.e., RDCap_Exp). We regard these as reflecting the amount of R&D a firm 
is expected to capitalize in a year given its specific characteristics. Conversely, by 
calculating the residuals of equation (1), we are able to identify the unexpected or 
“discretionary” amount of R&D a firm capitalized in a year (Kuo & Lee, 2017; Mazzi et al., 
2018). More specifically, the positive residuals of equation (1) reflect the amount of R&D a 
firm has overcapitalized in a year (RDCap_Over) compared with the expected amount 
(RDCap_Exp), while the negative residuals equal the amount of R&D a firm has 
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undercapitalized in a year (RDCap_Under). As we are interested only in identifying 
Capitalizers expected and abnormal amounts of capitalized R&D and not in assigning a 
measure of potential capitalization for Expensers, we replace RDCap_Exp, RDCap_Over 
and RDCap_Under equal to zero for Expensers. 
We then replicate our main analysis to reflect firms’ propensity for issuing bonds rather 
than borrowing funds from the syndicated loan market (H1) but decompose RDCap to the 
amount of R&D a firm is expected to capitalize (RDCap_Exp) and the amount of R&D a 
firm over (RDCap_Over) or undercapitalized (RDCap_Under).25 Results for this analysis are 
presented in Table 10 Panel A.26 
TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
While for models 1 and 2 the dependent variable is the dummy variable Bond_Issue, 
models 3 and 4 show results with the continuous variable %_of_Bond_Debt. Model 1 
documents a significant positive relationship between the amount of R&D a firm is expected 
to capitalize in a year and its propensity to borrow from the public debt market (the 
coefficient for RDCap_Exp is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level). By 
contrast, we do not find a significant association for the over (RDCap_Over) and 
undercapitalized portion (RDCap_Under) of capitalized R&D. In model 2 we repeat this 
analysis, this time just for the subsample of Capitalizers, and we find similar results (the 
coefficient for RDCap_Exp is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level). Similarly, 
when using the %_of_Bond_Debt in models 3 and 4 as the dependent variable, our results 
remain qualitatively unchanged. 
                                                 
25 See Francis et al. (2005) and Mazzi et al. (2018) for a similar approach in the context of discretionary accruals 
literature and capitalized development costs, respectively. 
26 For parsimony reasons, Table 10 only presents coefficients and corresponding t-statistics/z-statistics for the 
expected (RDCap_Exp), over- (RDCap_Over) and undercapitalized (RDCap_Under) amount of capitalized 
development costs. Given that we run some equations for the full sample of Capitalizers and Expensers and 
some for Capitalizers only, we also document coefficients and t-statistics/z-statistics for the dummy variable 
CAP. We also present results for the amount of R&D a firm expensed in a year (RDExp). 
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To explore whether the results of these tests also transfer to the pricing of capitalized 
R&D in debt markets, we repeat this analysis for the cost of public and private debt of 
capitalizing firms. Table 10 displays results for the effect of the three capitalized 
development cost components on the cost of public (Panel B) and private debt (Panel C).  
As shown by model 1 in Panels B and C, we find a reduction in the cost of debt only for 
the amount of R&D a firm is expected to capitalize in a year given its firm-specific 
characteristics (the coefficient for RDCap_Exp is negative and statistically significant at the 
5% level in model 1 in Panels B and C). For the amount of R&D a firm over or 
undercapitalized in a year, again we do not find a significant association with the prices of 
bonds and syndicated loans.  
Next, we split Capitalizers into firms with and without earnings management incentives. 
Results for the cost of public debt (private debt) are presented in models 2 and 3 of Panel B 
(C). Similarly to our prior analyses, we find only a negative relationship between the 
expected amount of capitalized R&D and the cost of public and private debt, when R&D 
capitalization is not associated with earnings management incentives (the coefficient for 
RDCap_Exp is negative and statistically significant at the 1% (5%) level in model 2 in Panel 
B (C)).  
These results imply, therefore, that the amount of R&D a firm is expected to capitalize 
facilitates firms’ access to public debt markets and reduces the cost of debt. On the one hand, 
undercapitalized amounts of R&D may result from firms not being able to meet market 
expectations regarding the amount of development costs capitalized in a year; on the other 
hand, debt market participants may regard overcapitalized amounts either as an indication 
that firms are being too optimistic with respect to the future success of their R&D 
investments or as a sign of earnings management. Accordingly, only the expected amount of 
capitalized development costs should contribute significantly to future profitability, whilst 
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the discretionary counterparts (RDCap_Over and RDCap_Under) may not represent 
underlying future economic benefits. To investigate these questions and analyze whether 
debt market participants rightfully regard the expected amount of capitalized R&D as the 
truthful, we repeat our analysis for the effect of capitalized R&D on future earnings and 
present the results in Table 10 Panel D. 
As displayed by model 1, we again find a significant positive association between the 
expected amount capitalized and future earnings, whilst the discretionary counterparts have 
no significant effect on future benefits (the coefficient for RDCap_Exp is positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level). When splitting Capitalizers into firms with and 
without earnings management incentives, we find results in line with debt pricing of the 
three development costs components. As displayed in models 2 and 3 of Panel D, we find 
that only the expected amount of capitalized development costs contributes to future 
earnings when a firm’s R&D capitalization is not attributed to earnings management (the 
coefficient for RDCap_Exp is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in model 
2). Ultimately, we repeat our analyses for the effect of R&D capitalization on audit fees and 
present results in Table 10 Panel D (model 4). While we find no significant effect for either 
the expected amount of capitalized R&D (RDCap_Exp) or the discretionary counterparts 
(RDCap_Over and RDCap_Under), the dummy variable CAP remains positive and highly 
significant. This result supports our earlier analysis, implying that when a firm capitalizes 
some of its R&D investments in a year, additional audit work is required, as auditors must be 
informed about details of the projects for which costs have been capitalized. 
 
5. Sensitivity analyses 
To assess the sensitivity of our findings, we perform a series of robustness tests. Results with 
respect to our relevant variables RDCap and RDExp can be accessed online in the separate 
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file provided on the Journal’s website (for sensitivity tests for H1 see SuppInfo_III; for H2 
and H3 see SuppInfo_IV; For sensitivity tests in respect to our additional analyses see 
SuppInfo_V and SuppInfo_VI).  
We start by examining the robustness of our findings after incorporating further control 
variables in the multivariate tests.27 Firstly, we include Ohlsons’s O_Score and a firm’s 
Current_Ratio as additional firm-specific determinants (Florou & Kosi, 2015; Ciftci & 
Darrough, 2016). Secondly, we include Debt_Enforcement (Ball et al., 2017) and 
Term_Spread (Florou & Kosi, 2015) as additional country controls when testing H2 and H3. 
Thirdly, we repeat our analyses with country fixed effects.28 For all three tests, inferences 
remain unchanged. We find even stronger support for H2 when using country fixed effects, as 
under 2SLS estimation; for the full sample, i.e. including both Capitalizers and Expensers, we 
now also find a significant negative association between the cost of public debt and 
capitalized R&D (the coefficient for RDCap is negative and statistically significant at the 5% 
level). Consequently, in addition to the strong heterogeneity between Capitalizers and 
Expensers at firm-level, time-invariant country differences may also obfuscate a significant 
relationship between capitalized R&D and the cost of public debt for the full sample.  
We note that our sample for testing H1 includes only one bond and/or syndicated loan 
per firm-year. Given that we controlled for the size and maturity of such a debt issue, 
arguably our results are biased, as the other bonds or syndicated loans issued by a firm in this 
given year may have a different amount and maturity compared with the bond or syndicated 
loan in our sample. Accordingly, we construct the variables log(Amount_avg) and 
log(Maturity_avg) (see Appendix I). This captures the average amount and maturity for all 
bonds and syndicated loans a firm issued in a given year. We then use these variables instead 
                                                 
27 Except where otherwise indicated, in these tests, we employ the same control variables and fixed effects as in 
all previous analyses.  
28 To mitigate multicollinearity issues, we exclude both time-variant and time-invariant country controls. It is 
noted that even when we include time-variant country controls, when we test our hypotheses with country fixed 
effects, results remain almost identical. 
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of the actual size and maturity of the bond or syndicated loan in the sample. Similarly, we 
construct and use the variable Term_Spread_avg, which proxies the average economic 
uncertainty for a country in a year. Also for these proxies results remain unchanged.  
We assess whether the results may be driven by our sample composition. Even though 
we captured privately placed bonds with a dummy variable when testing H2 (Ge & Liu, 
2015, Liu & Magnan, 2016), we follow Franco et al. (2016) and exclude these bonds, as their 
pricing may be different from that of public bonds (Denis & Mihov, 2003; Ge & Liu, 2015). 
As an additional test, we consider the potential impact on our results of the country with 
largest number of observations. In the spirit of Ball et al. (2017), we randomly select and 
retain only 150 debt issues from Chinese firms. This action reduces the weight of 
observations from China in the sample relative to those from Switzerland and Sweden (see 
last column of Table 2). Lastly, we examine the robustness of our findings to possible impact 
from the financial crisis by excluding all bonds and syndicated loans issued in the years 2008 
and 2009. Despite reduced sample sizes, with respect to all our hypotheses results under these 
three robustness tests are almost identical.  
We examine the robustness of our findings against possible sample selection bias. 
Following prior literature (Oswald 2008; Cazavan-Jeny et al., 2011), we included in our study 
only R&D active firms and excluded 5,225 debt securities issued by firms whose R&D 
investments were either equal to zero or missing. However, this procedure may introduce a 
sample selection bias for two reasons. Firstly, we include only firms that decided to invest in 
R&D voluntarily. Secondly, Datastream may have falsely identified firms as having no R&D 
investments. To mitigate these endogeneity concerns, we follow Ciftci and Darrough (2016) 
by employing Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we include all our 
sample firms (i.e. R&D active firms) and the previously excluded non R&D firms and then 
estimate a probit model in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if a 
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firm invested in R&D and zero otherwise. As independent variables we select firm (Size, 
MTB, Leverage, ROA, Tangibility, Current Ratio, Sales Growth, O_Score) and country (ASD, 
Corruption, Enforcement, GDP_Growth, Law) factors that potentially influence a firm’s 
decision to invest in R&D. We then generate the Inverse Mills Ratio from this first stage 
regression and include it as an additional explanatory variable in the equations for our 
hypotheses tests. Our results remain unchanged. 
We evaluate whether our results for H1 are affected by the statistical model used to 
analyze the effect of capitalized R&D on a firm’s choice of source of debt financing. Given 
that our dependent variable %_of_Bond_Debt has a lower value of zero and an upper value of 
one, we estimate equation (3) using a double-censored Tobit model (Florou & Kosi, 2015). 
Alternatively, we also apply a logit transformation for the variable %_of_Bond_Debt. In both 
cases, the results remain similar to our main findings.  
We use abnormal working capital accruals (DeFond & Park, 2001; Mazzi et al., 2017) to 
partition Capitalizers into groups, where an opportunistic use of R&D capitalization is more 
probable.29 In line with our results presented in Table 7, we find a reduction in the cost of 
both public and private debt only for Capitalizers with lower abnormal working capital 
accruals than their respective industry peers.  
We provide robustness tests for our additional analyses, where we investigated the effect 
of R&D capitalization on a firm’s future benefits and audit fees. For the results of these tests 
in regard to the variables RDCap, RDExp and CAP, see SuppInfo_V.  
To demonstrate that our results on the effect of capitalized R&D on future benefits are 
not conditional on our selected time-lag for future earnings, we repeat our analysis and 
measure future earnings for the upcoming four years instead of three. We also examine 
whether our results may somehow have been affected by the earnings proxy used. 
                                                 
29 We consider a Capitalizer to employ R&D capitalization opportunistically when its abnormal working capital 
accruals (AWCA) are higher than the respective industry median of all capitalizing firms. 
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Accordingly, we assess the validity of our findings by replacing operating earnings with the 
net profit before extraordinary items (Mazzi et al. 2018). For both tests our results remain 
qualitatively unchanged. We note that the results are robust against the inclusion of further 
firm-specific controls (ROA and O_Score) as well as country-specific controls (Law and 
Debt_Enforcement). Similarly, we include a firm’s Current_Ratio and the number of 
geographic segments (log(#_Segments_G)) as additional firm controls (Kuo & Lee, 2017), 
whilst also incorporating Enforcement and Corruption as additional country controls 
(Knechel et al., 2018) for our audit fee analysis. In both cases the dummy variable CAP, 
which reflects a firm’s binary decision to capitalize R&D, remains positive and highly 
significant.  
Identification of the expected (RDCap_Exp) and discretionary (RDCap_Over and 
RDCAP_Under) components of capitalized R&D depends on the firm and country-specific 
controls included in equation (1). To demonstrate that our results reflecting the effect of these 
three capitalized R&D components on debt financing are robust against different design 
choices for equation (1), we estimate the expected and discretionary components of 
capitalized R&D by using alternative firm and country variables in equation (1). We firstly 
exclude some control variables (Tangibility, Enforcement and Corruption) from equation (1). 
Secondly, we examine whether results change when we include some additional control 
variables (Current_Ratio, Debt_Enforcement) in equation (1). As shown in SuppInfo_VI 




Using a global sample of bonds and syndicated loans issued by public, non-financial firms in 
countries which mandated IFRS or fully converged their local GAAP with IFRS from 2005 
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onwards, we firstly examine how R&D capitalization relates to financing decisions in debt 
markets. Our results show that the amount of R&D a firm capitalized during a year is 
positively associated with a firm’s propensity for borrowing funds from public debt markets 
rather than the private syndicated loan market. This indicates that firms employ R&D 
capitalization in debt markets as a signaling mechanism to decrease information asymmetry 
to diffuse bondholders. Secondly, we find that both public and private debt investors price 
R&D investments of capitalizing firms consistent with the restrictive recognition criteria 
under IAS 38.57. Capitalized development costs fulfilling these recognition criteria are, 
therefore, closer to being used or sold, and hence are likely to generate probable future 
economic benefits. For Capitalizers, our results show that the capitalized component of R&D 
investments reduces the cost of public and private debt, whilst the expensed counterpart is not 
priced by debt investors. We provide evidence that debt markets are able to identify firms’ 
motives for R&D capitalization, as we find a reduction in the cost of debt only when R&D 
capitalization is not attributed to earnings management incentives. In further tests we find that 
capitalized R&D contributes positively to future earnings, but only for the subsample of firms 
whose capitalized amount is not associated with earnings management incentives. Our results 
imply that R&D capitalization can be deemed to be a signaling device as it is positively 
associated with firms’ audit fees. Lastly, we find that it is the expected amount of capitalized 
development costs and not the discretionary counterparts that facilitates firms’ access to 
public debt markets, reduces the cost of debt, and contributes positively to future earnings.  
This study is, to our knowledge, the first to examine the effects of R&D capitalization on 
debt markets. However, it is subject to several caveats which pave the way for future 
research. Firstly, our analysis focuses only on two external funding sources available to firms, 
the public debt market and the private syndicated loan market. Hence, our study captures only 
partially the complex decisions firms face when selecting their financing strategy. Further 
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contributions to research could, therefore, result from examining how R&D capitalization is 
related to the choice between equity and debt issuance. Moreover, as noted by Florou and 
Kosi (2015), the coverage procedures of bond and syndicated loan databases are biased 
towards larger firms. Thus, it might be questionable as to whether our results are transferable 
to smaller non-public firms with more severe risk-benefit profiles. Finally, given that data on 
debt covenants is scarce for firms outside the US (Ball et al., 2015; Brown, 2016), we were 
able only implicitly to control for the existence of such covenants when analyzing the 
determinants of firms’ capitalized R&D. Future research could, therefore, benefit from 




Appendix I: Variable definitions 
Firm-specific variables 
Capitalized R&D The amount of R&D a firm capitalized during year t. It is mostly hand-collected or 
calculated following Mazzi et al. (2018): (net development costst0 (WC02504) – net 
development costst-1 (WC02504) + amortization of R&D assetto  (WC01153)) .  
Expensed R&D The amount of R&D a firm expensed during year t (WC01201) 
RD_Intensity (Capitalized R&D + Expensed R&D) divided by sales (WC01001)  
RDCap Capitalized R&D divided by sales (WC01001) 
RDExp Expensed R&D divided by sales (WC01001) 
Capex A firm’s capital expenditures during a year (WC04601) divided by sales (WC01001) 
CAP A dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm capitalized R&D in the fiscal year 
directly prior to the debt issue date, and zero otherwise 
Lag_RDCap The amount of R&D a firm capitalized during the previous year divided by previous 
year’s sales (WC01001).  
RD_Value The success of a firm’s R&D program, measured as the difference between the 
market value of equity (WC08001) and adjusted book value of equity (book value of 
equity (WC03501) – net development costs (WC02504)) divided by the sum of 
current and lagged R&D expenditures (Capitalized R&D + Expensed R&D) 
Cut_RD A dummy variable which is equal to one if current R&D expenditures (Capitalized 
R&D + Expensed R&D) are smaller than lagged R&D expenditures, and zero 
otherwise 
Beat_Zero A dummy variable which is equal to one if earnings assuming full expensing 
(earnings (WC01551) + amortization of R&D asset (WC01153) – Capitalized R&D) 
are negative and earnings assuming full capitalization (earnings assuming full 
expensing + Capitalized R&D + Expensed R&D) are positive, and zero otherwise 
(Dinh et al., 2016; Mazzi et al., 2018). Earnings refer to income before extra items 
(WC01551) 
Beat_Past A dummy variable which is equal to one if the prior year’s earnings (WC01551) are 
higher than earnings assuming full expensing (earnings (WC01551) + amortization of 
R&D asset (WC01153) – Capitalized R&D) and prior year’s earnings (WC01551) 
are lower than earnings assuming full capitalization (earnings assuming full 
expensing + Capitalized R&D + Expensed R&D), and zero otherwise (Dinh et al., 
2016; Mazzi et al., 2018). Earnings refer to net income before extra items 
(WC01551) 
Beat_Bench A dummy variable which is equal to one if either Beat_Zero and/or Beat_Past is 
equal to one, and zero otherwise 
log(Size) Natural logarithm of adjusted total assets (Total assets in USD (WC02999) – net 
development costs in USD (WC02504)) 
MTB Market value of equity (WC08001) divided by adjusted book value of equity (book 
value of equity (WC03501) – net development costs (WC02504)) 
Leverage Total debt (WC03255) divided by adjusted total assets  
ROA Adjusted EBIT (EBIT(WC18191) + amortization of R&D asset (WC01153) – 
Capitalized R&D) divided by adjusted total assets  
Tangibility  Net property plant and equipment (WC02501) divided by adjusted total assets  
Rated A dummy variable which is equal to one if a debt issue is rated by Standard and 
Poor’s, and zero otherwise (source: TR Eikon Deal Screener) 
Invest_Grade A dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm’s debt issue has an investment 
grade rating by Standard and Poor’s, and zero otherwise. In case a firm’s debt issue is 
not rated, we estimate it based on the procedure of Barth et al. (1998, pp. 18-20) and 
Florou and Kosi (2015, p. 1451 f.). More specifically, for firms with rated debt, debt 
ratings (on a scale of 2-27 for ratings AAA to D) are regressed on financial ratios, 
and the financial ratio’s estimated coefficients are then used to calculate debt ratings 
for firms without rated debt. The estimated rating is based on the following equation 
(Barth et al., 1998): Rating = a0 + a1(adjusted total asset in USD / 105) + a2(adjusted 
net income / adjusted total assets) + a3(long-term-debt (WC03251) / adjusted total 
assets) + a4(one if a firm paid dividend in the current year (WC05376), and zero 
otherwise). An estimate is transformed into a rating by rounding to the nearest whole 
number, with a minimum of 2 and maximum of 27. In case the estimated debt rating 
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is less than 12, which is equal to S&P’s cut-off between investment grade and below 
investment grade, we assign the debt issue an investment grade rating. 
O_Score Ohlson’s (1980) O-Score computed as: -1.32 – 0.407 * natural logarithm of adjusted 
total assets in USD + 6.03 * (total liabilities (WC03351) / adjusted total assets) - 1.43 
* (working capital (WC02201 – WC03101) / adjusted total assets) + 0.076 * (current 
liabilities (WC03101) / current assets (WC02201)) – 1.72 * (1 if total liabilities 
(WC03351) > adjusted total assets, and 0 otherwise) – 0.521 * (adjusted net incomet0 
(net income (WC01651) + amortization of R&D asset (WC01153) – Capitalized 
R&D) – adjusted net incomet-1) / (|adjusted net incometo| + |adjusted net incomet-1|)) 
Current_Ratio Current assets (WC02201) divded by current liabilities (WC03101) 
AWCA Abnormal working capital accruals scaled by the end-of-the-year adjusted total assets 
(DeFond & Park, 2001; Mazzi et al., 2017), computed as: 
(WCt – WCt-1 * Salest0 /Salest-1) / adjusted total assetsto. WC stands for working 
capital accruals, computed as: Current assets (WC02201) – cash and equivalents 
(WC02001) – current liabilities (WC03101) + short-term debt (WC03051) 
NI The sum of future earnings measured from year t+1 to year t+3 scaled by the market 
value of equity (WC08001). Earnings are defined as the sum of operating income 
(WC01250), expensed R&D (WC01201), depreciation and amortization (WC01151). 
log(Fees) Natural logarithm of audit fees (WC01801) in thousands of USD. 
Returns_Var The variability of stock returns, measured as the standard deviation of monthly stock 
returns over the fiscal year. Monthly stock returns are computed using the total return 
index (RI) in Datastream. 
ADR A dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm has an ADR listed on a US 
exchange (WC11496), and zero otherwise. 
Invrec The sum of inventories (WC02101) and receivables (WC02051) divided by adjusted 
total assets 
Loss A dummy variable which is equal to one if a negative net income (WC01651) is 
reported, and zero otherwise 
Opinion A dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm does not receive a standard 
unqualified audit opinion (WC07546), and zero otherwise 
Big4 A dummy variable which is equal to one if the annual report is audited by a Big 4 
auditor (TR Eikon: BSAuditorCode), and zero otherwise 
log(#_Segments) The natural logarithm of one plus the number of product segments for which sales are 
reported (WC19501; WC19511; WC19521; […]; WC19591)  
log(#_Segments_G) The natural logarithm of one plus the number of geographic segments for which sales 
are reported (WC19601; WC19611; WC19621; […]; WC19691) 
Bond/syndicated loan-specific variables 
Bond_Issue A dummy variable which is equal to one if a debt issue is a bond issue, and zero 
otherwise (source: TR Eikon Deal Screener) 
%_of_Bond_Debt The percentage of bond debt, computed as the ratio of the total amount of borrowed 
public debt and the total amount of debt (public and private) (source: TR Eikon Deal 
Screener) 
Cost_of_debt For bonds, this is the difference in basis points between the yield to maturity of a 
corporate bond at issue date and the interest yield of a treasury security (T-bill) 
issued by the same country and with comparable maturity to the corporate bond; For 
syndicated loans, it is defined as the amount the borrower pays in basis points over 
LIBOR or a LIBOR equivalent for each dollar drawn (source: TR Eikon Deal 
Screener/Datastream) 
log(Debt_Amount) The natural logarithm of the size of each loan facility or bond (source: TR Eikon 
Deal Screener) 
log(Amount_avg) Reflecting the average amount of all bonds and syndicated loans a firm issued in a 
given year. It is calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio between the amount a 
firm borrowed from the bond and syndicated loan market in a given year divided by 
the number of bonds and syndicated loans a firm issued in a given year (source: TR 
Eikon Deal Screener) 
log(Maturity) The natural logarithm of the number of months from the date the debt is issued until 




log(Maturity_avg) Reflecting the average maturity of all bonds and syndicated loans a firm issued in a 
given year. It is calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio between the sum of 
the maturity of all bonds and syndicated loans a firm issued in a given yeard divided 
by the number of bonds and syndicated loans a firm issued in a given year (source: 
TR Eikon Deal Screener) 
Private_Placement A dummy variable which is equal to one if a bond is issued through private 
placement, and zero otherwise (source: TR Eikon Deal Screener) 
Callable A dummy variable which is equal to one if a bond has a call feature, and zero 
otherwise (source: TR Eikon Deal Screener) 
Term_Loan A dummy variable which is equal to one if a syndicated loan is a term loan, and zero 
otherwise (source: TR Eikon Deal Screener) 
Issue_Both A dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm issues in a particular year at least 
one bond and at least one syndicated loan, and zero otherwise (source: TR Eikon 
Deal Screener) 
Country-specific variables 
ASD The anti-self-director index from Djankov et al. (2008) 
Country_PoD The probability of default of a firm’s country of domicile in the year and month the 
debt is issued. This measure comes from the National University of Singapore, Risk 
Management Institute (see http://rmicri.org and Duan and Wang (2012)). It 
combines leverage and asset volatility and reflects the mean value of the probability 
of default across all firms within a country. The probability of default is predicted 
for different time horizons, ranging from 1 month to 60 months. We select a time 
horizon of 60 months in order to mitigate the influence of short-term shocks on a 
country’s probability of default.  
Corruption The inverse of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). This is calculated as the 
difference between the highest possible CPI score (i.e. 10) and each country’s 
corruption level (source: Transparency International) 
Debt_Enforcement A country score from Djankov et al. (2008), capturing the efficiency of debt 
enforcement in each country 
Enforcement A country score from Brown et al. (2014), capturing differences between countries 
regarding the audit of financial statements and the enforcement of compliance with 
accounting standards 
Exchange_Risk The exchange risk volatility of a firm’s country of domicile, proxied by the 
coefficient of the variation of daily USD to local currency exchange rates for the 12 
months prior to the debt issue date (source: Datastream). For the audit fee analysis, 
this is calculated for the 12 months prior to the date of the fiscal year-end 
GDP_Growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local 
currency (source: World Bank) 
Law A dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm’s country of domicile is a common-
law country, and zero otherwise (La Porta et al., 1998)  
Term_Spread The difference between a government’s ten-year and two-year T-bill rate calculated 
for the debt issue date (source: Datastream) 
Term_Spread_avg Reflects the economic uncertainty of a firm’s country of domicile. It is calculated as 
the sum of the term spread of all bonds and syndicated loans a firm issued in a year 






Appendix II: Determinants of the amount of capitalized R&D 
Appendix II: Determinants of the amount of capitalized R&D – Tobit regressions 
 Full Sample Bond Sample Loan sample 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant -0.000 -0.000 -0.004 -0.004 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.04) (-0.00) (-1.27) (-1.30) (0.00) (0.09) 
RD_Intensity a -0.013 -0.013 -0.004 -0.004 -0.014 -0.013 
 (-1.58) (-1.60) (-0.40) (-0.45) (-1.14) (-1.06) 
log(Size)  0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.46) (0.51) (2.33) (2.36) (-0.67) (-0.58) 
MTB a  -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000** -0.000** 
 (-1.19) (-1.20) (1.06) (1.12) (-2.00) (-2.12) 
Leverage a -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.003 
 (-0.62) (-0.76) (-1.29) (-1.36) (0.97) (0.94) 
ROA a 0.002 0.001 -0.008 -0.009 0.012** 0.011* 
 (0.53) (0.31) (-1.45) (-1.54) (2.00) (1.91) 
Tangibility a -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.43) (-0.35) (0.52) (0.56) (-1.07) (-0.95) 
O_Score a 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.000 0.001 
 (2.38) (2.54) (2.45) (2.51) (1.20) (1.50) 
RD_Value a -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-0.83) (-0.77) (-0.01) (0.03) (-1.16) (-1.13) 
Lag_RDCap a 1.094*** 1.094*** 1.060*** 1.062*** 1.096*** 1.091*** 
 (34.68) (34.98) (30.54) (30.73) (19.38) (19.35) 
Cut_RD  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (-5.43) (-5.45) (-3.25) (-3.31) (-5.28) (-5.20) 
Beat_Zero  0.002**  0.002  0.003***  
 (2.27)  (1.26)  (2.66)  
Beat_Past 0.001***  0.002***  0.001  
 (3.35)  (3.74)  (1.11)  
Beat_Bench   0.002***  0.002***  0.001* 
  (4.27)  (4.34)  (1.89) 
Enforcement  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.12) (-0.13) (-1.25) (-1.22) (1.00) (0.94) 
GDP_Growth a -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (-4.47) (-4.40) (-3.70) (-3.60) (-2.14) (-2.13) 
ASD -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-1.59) (-1.59) (-1.22) (-1.24) (-1.25) (-1.23) 
Corruption -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.93) (-0.95) (-0.66) (-0.66) (0.18) (0.12) 
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 1,455 1,455 1,087 1,087 467 467 
Log-Pseudolikelihood 1659.24 1659.13 1,119.94 1,120.96 714.37 712.98 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Mean VIF 2.24 2.27 2.47 2.51 2.10 2.13 
Notes: This table reports results for analyzing factors associated with the amount of R&D a firm capitalized in a year. 
Models 1 to 6 are estimated as a zero (i.e. left) censored Tobit model at firm-level. Models 1, 3 and 5 differ from 2, 4, and 
6 only in regard to the variables employed to proxy earnings benchmark beating. Results are presented for the full sample 
of firms (models 1 and 2) and separately for firms accessing the public debt market (models 3 and 4) and syndicated loan 
market (models 5 and 6). Also note that the sum of observations for the bond and loan sample (n = 1,554) is slightly 
higher than the number of observations for the full sample (n = 1,455). This is because firms can issue both public bonds 
and syndicated loans in a given year. Hence, one specific firm-year can be included in both the bond (models 3 and 4) and 
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loan sample (models 5 and 6). For the full sample, however, we exclude duplicate observations. For a detailed description 
of all presented variables see Appendix I. VIF is the Variance Inflation factor. Z-statistics based on clustered standard 
errors at firm-level are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% (two-tailed) 




Appendix III: Descriptive statistics across public and private borrowers 
 Public borrowers – Bond market Private borrowers – Syndicated loan market Comparison 
 n mean min median max n mean min median max t-test Wilcox 
Panel A: Bond and loan-specific variables           
Cost_of_debt 1,866 200.831 40.500 177.000 471.200 722 209.432 20.000 180.000 640.500 1.561 0.254 
Debt_Amount (in mil. US$) 1,866 431.309 31.281 250.000 1449.485 722 1106.591 27.977 352.390 5506.609 11.454*** 7.212*** 
Maturity (in months) 1,866 76.549 12.230 64.000 182.670 722 49.401 12.170 54.770 85.230 -21.474*** -17.399*** 
Callable 1,866 0.143 0.000 0.000 1.000        
Private_Placement 1,866 0.242 0.000 0.000 1.000        
Term_Loan      722 0.461 0.000 0.000 1.000   
Panel B: Firm-specific and country variables           
RD_Intensity 1,087 0.024 0.000 0.014 0.171 467 0.026 0.000 0.009 0.171 0.842 -1.795* 
RDCap 1,087 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.042 467 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.645 4.551*** 
RDExp 1,087 0.021 0.000 0.012 0.166 467 0.023 0.000 0.007 0.166 0.701 -3.048*** 
Lag_RDCap 1,087 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.042 467 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.533 4.047*** 
CAP 1,087 0.293 0.000 0.000 1.000 467 0.428 0.000 0.000 1.000 5.207 5.164*** 
RD_Value 1,087 172.842 -241.250 17.560 4254.213 467 177.294 -241.250 11.628 4254.213 0.138 -2.592** 
Cut_RD 1,087 0.303 0.000 0.000 1.000 467 0.313 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.391 0.391 
Beat_Zero 1,087 0.025 0.000 0.000 1.000 467 0.039 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.477 1.477 
Beat_Past 1,087 0.187 0.000 0.000 1.000 467 0.148 0.000 0.000 1.000 -1.856* -1.854* 
Beat_Bench 1,087 0.201 0.000 0.000 1.000 467 0.178 0.000 0.000 1.000 -1.043 -1.043 
log(Size) 1,087 15.785 10.390 15.681 19.903 467 15.589 10.973 15.361 19.903 -1.990* -2.122** 
MTB 1,087 2.597 0.342 2.025 14.656 467 2.494 0.342 2.001 14.656 -0.857 -1.800* 
Leverage 1,087 0.309 0.029 0.297 0.646 467 0.289 0.029 0.274 0.646 -2.560** -2.549** 
ROA 1,087 0.067 -0.089 0.063 0.226 467 0.069 -0.089 0.068 0.226 0.800 1.376 
Tangibility 1,087 0.305 0.011 0.264 0.812 467 0.275 0.011 0.227 0.812 -2.749*** -3.041*** 
O_Score 1,087 -4.128 -6.727 -4.131 -1.435 467 -4.121 -6.727 -4.224 -1.435 0.119 -0.298 
Rated 1,087 0.378 0.000 0.000 1.000 467 0.075 0.000 0.000 1.000 -12.720*** -12.109*** 
Invest_Grade 1,087 0.879 0.000 1.000 1.000 467 0.835 0.000 1.000 1.000 -2.304** -2.301** 
Issue_Both 1,087 0.089 0.000 0.000 1.000 467 0.208 0.000 0.000 1.000 6.563*** 6.476*** 
NI 775 0.695 -0.055 0.540 3.052 367 0.729 -0.055 0.581 3.052 0.995 1.352 
Capex 775 0.084 0.004 0.054 0.599 367 0.086 0.004 0.049 0.599 0.382 -1.847* 
Returns_Var 775 0.088 0.029 0.080 0.262 367 0.090 0.029 0.077 0.270 0.585 -0.701 
log(Fees) 931 7.562 3.784 7.629 13.412 395 7.983 4.754 7.904 11.561 3.928*** 3.656*** 
ADR 931 0.286 0.000 0.000 1.000 395 0.370 0.000 0.000 1.000 3.028*** 3.018*** 
Loss 931 0.093 0.000 0.000 1.000 395 0.167 0.000 0.000 1.000 3.857*** 3.837*** 
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Appendix III continued             
             
Invrec 931 0.285 0.036 0.272 0.696 395 0.279 0.036 0.269 0.696 -0.623 -0.618 
Opinion 931 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 395 0.005 0.000 0.000 1.000 2.175** 2.172** 
Big4 931 0.680 0.000 1.000 1.000 395 0.944 0.000 1.000 1.000 10.719*** 10.286*** 
log(#_Segments) 931 1.550 0.000 1.609 2.398 395 1.578 0.000 1.609 2.398 0.928 0.648 
ASD 1,087 0.585 0.203 0.757 1.000 467 0.578 0.203 0.429 1.000 -0.478 -0.311 
Corruption 1,087 3.748 0.600 3.000 6.500 467 2.722 0.500 2.300 6.500 -9.520*** -8.042*** 
Enforcement 1,087 41.475 20.000 42.000 54.000 467 45.375 20.000 45.000 54.000 9.792*** 9.944*** 
GDP_Growth 1,087 3.531 -5.482 2.556 10.636 467 1.747 -5.482 1.806 10.636 -9.561*** -8.160*** 
Law 1,087 0.153 0.000 0.000 1.000 467 0.377 0.000 0.000 1.000 10.088*** 9.776*** 
Country_PoD 1,866 0.019 0.010 0.018 0.051 722 0.020 0.011 0.019 0.051 4.065*** 3.355*** 
Exchange_Risk 1,866 0.034 0.001 0.027 0.131 722 0.039 0.001 0.037 0.131 4.391*** 6.114*** 
Term_Spread 1,866 1.236 -0.303 1.211 2.815 722 1.434 -0.303 1.443 2.815 6.167*** 6.408*** 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics across firms accessing the the public debt market and firms accessing the private syndicated loan market in a particular year. T-
test reports t-statistics for differences in means between the two groups (two-tailed). Wilcox reports z-statistics for the Wilcoxon ranksum test (Mann-Whitney) to test the 
equality of the population between the two groups (two-tailed). Bond- and loan-specific variables are presented at an issue-level, as every debt issue differs in its contractual 
terms. Firm-specific and country variables are presented at a firm-year level. In case a firm issues at least one bond and one syndicated loan in a year, the firm is presented in 
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Panel A: Choice of source of debt financing – Public debt market vs. private 
syndicated loan market 
   
For our sample we focus on countries that mandatorily adopted IFRS or fully 
converged their local GAAP to IFRS in the period between 2005 to 2013. We 
include only bonds/syndicated loans issued by public non-financial institutions in 
the period 2008-2016. Bonds with a floating rate note (Bessembinder et al., 2009; 
Liu & Magnan, 2016) and perpetual bonds (Liu & Magnan, 2016) are excluded. 
15,631 7,202 8,427 
Debt issues matched to Datastream based on several identifiers (Bond ISIN, ticker 
symbol, issuer ticker) and company name. 
10,277 6,821 3,456 
Debt issues of firms reporting according to US-GAAP  -453 -174 -279 
Debt issues of firms which did not report either R&D expenses or an R&D asset in 
the fiscal year directly prior to the debt issue date 
-5,225 -3,137 -2,088 
Debt issues of firms from the Oil and Gas industry -294 -185 -109 
Debt issues of firms where the capitalized amount of R&D during the year was not 
accessible 
-453 -434 -19 
Missing data on firm-specific variables -244 -160 -84 
Missing data on country-specific variables -80 -43 -37 
Missing data on issue-specific variables -99 -95 -4 
Exclusion of bonds with short term maturity (<12 months) -392 -392 0 
Total sample 3,037 2,201 836 
Multiple debt issues of the same type by the same firm within one year -1,418 -1,073 -345 
Only including countries with more than 10 observations -65 -41 -24 
Final sample  1,554 1,087 467 
Debt issues where the issuing firm capitalized R&D during the year 519 319 200 
Debt issues where the issuing firm only expensed R&D during the year 1,035 768 267 
    
Panel B: Cost of public debt – Bond sample    
Total sample  2,201  
Missing data on the cost of public debt  -160  
Negative debt risk premium  -130  
Only including countries with more than 10 observations  -45  
Final sample   1,866  
Bond issues where the issuing firm capitalized R&D during the year  629  
Bond issues where the issuing firm only expensed R&D during the year  1,237  
    
Panel C: Cost of private debt – Syndicated Loan sample    
Total sample   836 
Missing data on the cost of debt   -66 
Only including countries with more than 10 observations   -48 
Final sample    722 
Syndicated loan issues where the issuing firm capitalized R&D during the year   333 
Syndicated loan issues where the issuing firm only expensed R&D during the year   389 
Notes: The sample period is 2008-2016. Panel A presents the sample selection process for analyzing the relationship 
between the amount of R&D a firm capitalized during a year and a firm’s propensity for issuing bonds rather than 
borrowing funds from the syndicated loan market in the subsequent year. Panels B and C present the sample selection 
process for analyzing the effect of capitalized R&D on firms’ cost of public (Panel B) and private debt (Panel C). We 
match bond issuing firms from Thomson Reuters Eikon Deal Screener to Worldscope based on multiple company 
identifiers (i.e., Bond ISIN, ticker symbol and issuer ticker) and company name. Similarly, we match firms obtaining 
syndicated loans from Thomson Reuters Eikon Deal Screener to Worldscope based on ticker symbol and company name. 
The amount of R&D a firm capitalized in the fiscal year directly prior to the debt issue date is either calculated based on 





Table 2: Sample composition by country 
 Source of debt financing   Cost of debt  
 Bonds  Syndicated Loans  All  Bonds  Syndicated Loans  All 
 Capitalizers Expensers Sum  Capitalizers Expensers Sum  Issues  Capitalizers Expensers Sum  Capitalizers Expensers Sum  Issues 
Australia 7 19 26  9 11 20  46  8 30 38  17 20 37  75 
Austria 5 16 21  1 3 4  25  5 20 25  0 0 0  25 
Belgium 8 15 23  4 9 13  36  13 46 59  6 22 28  87 
Brazil 4 3 7  2 5 7  14  0 0 0  0 0 0  0 
Canada 3 5 8  7 17 24  32  4 7 11  7 14 21  32 
China 16 386 402  6 20 26  428  19 463 482  7 21 28  510 
Finland 1 33 34  0 18 18  52  4 36 40  0 23 23  63 
France 87 72 159  30 27 57  216  166 197 363  48 32 80  443 
Germany 46 47 93  32 31 63  156  181 91 272  56 50 106  378 
Hong Kong 0 10 10  5 30 35  45  0 11 11  6 44 50  61 
Italy 19 11 30  16 7 23  53  16 23 39  21 10 31  70 
Malaysia 0 0 0  0 0 0  0  4 8 12  0 0 0  12 
Netherlands 11 18 29  7 10 17  46  21 29 50  12 21 33  83 
New 
Zealand 
0 6 6  1 8 9  15  0 18 18  0 0 0  18 
Norway 0 7 7  1 5 6  13  0 0 0  5 9 14  14 
Philippines 0 0 0  0 0 0  0  8 8 16  0 0 0  16 
Singapore 11 6 17  2 2 4  21  19 7 26  0 0 0  26 
South 
Africa 
0 0 0  0 0 0  0  0 0 0  4 7 11  11 
Spain 8 1 9  30 3 33  42  0 0 0  71 4 75  75 
Sweden 34 16 50  3 4 7  57  52 33 85  3 8 11  96 
Switzerland 9 43 52  2 6 8  60  10 79 89  4 14 18  107 
Turkey 4 1 5  2 7 9  14  0 0 0  5 10 15  15 
UK 46 53 99  40 44 84  183  99 131 230  61 80 141  371 
                    
Total 319 768 1,087  200 267 467  1,554  629 1,237 1,866  333 389 722  2,588 
Note: Table 2 presents the sample constitution for analyzing firms’ choice of source of debt financing (H1) and cost of debt (H2 and H3) by country. The sample period is 2008-2016. For 
analyzing the effect of capitalized R&D on firms’ choice of source of debt financing, we deleted multiple debt debt issues of the same type by the same firm within the same year (Dhaliwal et 
al., 2011; Florou & Kosi, 2015; Ball et al., 2017). This results in a total sample of 1,554 debt issues, of which 1,087 are bonds and 467 are loans. To examine the effect of capitalized R&D on 
firms’ cost of debt, we followed prior literature (Eberhart et al., 2008; Barath et al., 2008; Florou & Kosi, 2015; Francis et al., 2017) and retained multiple debt issues of a firm in the same year, 
as debt issues differ in their contractual terms. This resulted in a total sample of 1,866 (722) bond (syndicated loan) issues for the cost of public (private) debt. Of these, 629 (333) are bond 
(syndicated loan) issues, where the bond (syndicated loan) issuing firm capitalized R&D in the fiscal year directly prior to the debt issue. 
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Table 3 Panel A: Descriptive statistics – Full Sample 
 n sd Mean min median max 
Choice of source of debt financing variables     
Bond_Issue 1,554 0.459 0.699 0.000 1.000 1.000 
%_of_Bond_Debt 1,455 0.434 0.716 0.000 1.000 1.000 
       
Bond-specific variables       
Cost_of_debt (in basis points) 1,866 119.280 200.831 40.500 177.000 471.200 
Debt_Amount (in mil. US$) 1,866 429.307 431.309 31.281 250.000 1449.485 
Maturity (in months) 1,866 45.160 76.549 12.230 64.000 182.670 
Callable 1,866 0.350 0.143 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Private_Placement 1,866 0.428 0.242 0.000 0.000 1.000 
       
Loan-specific variables       
Cost_of_debt (in basis points) 722 141.105 209.432 20.000 180.000 640.500 
Debt_Amount (in mil. US$) 722 1561.524 1106.591 27.977 352.390 5506.609 
Maturity (in months) 722 19.101 49.401 12.170 54.770 85.230 
Term_Loan 722 0.499 0.461 0.000 0.000 1.000 
       
Firm- and country-specific variables 
RD_Intensity 1,455 0.034 0.025 0.000 0.013 0.171 
RDCap 1,455 0.008 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.042 
RDExp 1,455 0.032 0.022 0.000 0.010 0.166 
Lag_RDCap 1,455 0.008 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.042 
CAP 1,455 0.470 0.329 0.000 0.000 1.000 
RD_Value 1,455 569.357 171.379 -241.250 16.511 4254.213 
Cut_RD 1,455 0.460 0.303 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Beat_Zero 1,455 0.169 0.030 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Beat_Past 1,455 0.381 0.177 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Beat_Bench 1,455 0.397 0.196 0.000 0.000 1.000 
log(Size) 1,455 1.761 15.643 10.390 15.493 19.903 
MTB 1,455 2.180 2.588 0.342 2.026 14.656 
Leverage 1,455 0.140 0.303 0.029 0.287 0.646 
ROA 1,455 0.055 0.068 -0.089 0.064 0.226 
Tangibility 1,455 0.197 0.296 0.011 0.253 0.812 
O_Score 1,455 1.093 -4.100 -6.727 -4.125 -1.435 
Rated 1,455 0.459 0.300 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Invest_Grade 1,455 0.343 0.864 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Issue_Both 1,455 0.253 0.069 0.000 0.000 1.000 
NI 1,054 0.533 0.702 -0.055 0.552 3.052 
Capex 1,054 0.093 0.085 0.004 0.052 0.599 
Returns_Var 1,054 0.043 0.089 0.029 0.080 0.270 
log(Fees) 1,243 1.802 7.611 3.784 7.587 13.412 
ADR 1,243 0.456 0.294 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Loss 1,243 0.318 0.114 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Invrec 1,243 0.160 0.287 0.036 0.276 0.696 
Opinion 1,243 0.040 0.002 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Big4 1,243 0.436 0.745 0.000 1.000 1.000 
log(#_Segments) 1,243 0.492 1.551 0.000 1.609 2.398 
ASD 1,455 0.255 0.590 0.203 0.642 1.000 
Table 3 Panel A continued:       
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Corruption 1,455 2.031 3.490 0.500 2.700 6.500 
Enforcement 1,455 7.472 42.460 20.000 44.000 54.000 
GDP_Growth 1,455 3.475 3.136 -5.482 2.277 10.636 
Law 1,455 0.413 0.219 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Country_PoD 2,588 0.006 0.020 0.010 0.018 0.051 
Exchange_Risk 2,588 0.025 0.036 0.001 0.030 0.131 





Table 3 Panel B: Descriptive statistics across Capitalizers and Expensers 
 Capitalizers Expensers Comparison 
 N mean min median max n mean min median max t-test Wilcox 
Choice of source of debt financing variables 
Bond_Issue 519 0.615 0.000 1.000 1.000 1,035 0.742 0.000 1.000 1.000 5.207*** 5.164*** 
%_of_Bond_Debt 479 0.626 0.000 1.000 1.000 976 0.787 0.000 1.000 1.000 5.624*** 5.651*** 
             
Bond-specific variables 
Cost_of_debt (in bp) 629 203.789 40.500 176.100 471.200 1,237 199.327 40.500 177.000 471.200 -0.764 -0.512 
Debt_Amount (in mil. 
US$) 
629 461.268 31.281 320.675 1449.485 1,237 416.075 31.281 233.958 1449.485 -2.152** -2.407** 
Maturity (in months) 629 82.327 12.230 74.900 182.670 1,237 73.611 12.230 61.200 182.670 -3.957*** -5.288*** 
Callable 629 0.141 0.000 0.000 1.000 1,237 0.144 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.140 0.140 
Private_Placement 629 0.246 0.000 0.000 1.000 1,237 0.239 0.000 0.000 1.000 -0.340 -0.340 
             
Loan-specific variables 
Cost_of_debt (in bp) 333 216.036 20.000 200.000 640.500 389 203.779 20.000 170.000 640.500 -1.164 -2.153** 
Debt_Amount 333 1004.330 27.977 322.290 5506.609 389 1194.131 27.977 415.791 5506.609 1.630 1.524 
Maturity 333 50.318 12.170 57.100 85.230 389 48.617 12.170 48.700 85.230 -1.194 -1.440 
Term_Loan 333 0.465 0.000 0.000 1.000 389 0.458 0.000 0.000 1.000 -0.212 -0.212 
             
Firm-specific and country variables 
RD_Intensity 479 0.035 0.000 0.022 0.171 976 0.020 0.000 0.009 0.171 -8.107*** -8.309*** 
RDCap 479 0.009 0.000 0.004 0.042 976       
RDExp 479 0.026 0.000 0.015 0.166 976 0.020 0.000 0.009 0.166 -3.225*** -0.751 
Lag_RDCap 479 0.009 0.000 0.005 0.042 976 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 -25.133*** -35.414*** 
RD_Value 479 75.515 -241.250 5.724 4254.213 976 218.427 -241.250 26.882 4254.213 4.529*** 9.190*** 
Cut_RD 479 0.344 0.000 0.000 1.000 976 0.283 0.000 0.000 1.000 -2.409** -2.405** 
Beat_Zero 479 0.069 0.000 0.000 1.000 976 0.010 0.000 0.000 1.000 -6.287*** -6.205*** 




   
Table 3 Panel B continued   
 Capitalizers Expensers Comparison 
 n Mean min median max n mean min median max t-test Wilcox 
Beat_Bench 479 0.305 0.000 0.000 1.000 976 0.142 0.000 0.000 1.000 -7.468*** -7.332*** 
log(Size) 479 15.860 10.839 15.965 19.903 976 15.536 10.390 15.377 19.687 -3.308*** -3.501*** 
MTB 479 2.578 0.342 2.026 14.656 976 2.592 0.342 2.026 14.656 0.112 0.306 
Leverage 479 0.297 0.029 0.275 0.646 976 0.306 0.029 0.294 0.646 1.113 1.418 
ROA 479 0.061 -0.089 0.061 0.226 976 0.071 -0.089 0.066 0.226 3.154*** 2.764*** 
Tangibility 479 0.242 0.011 0.204 0.812 976 0.323 0.011 0.293 0.812 7.498*** 7.676*** 
O_Score 479 -3.838 -6.727 -3.890 -1.435 976 -4.228 -6.727 -4.233 -1.435 -6.493*** -6.104*** 
Rated 479 0.399 0.000 0.000 1.000 976 0.252 0.000 0.000 1.000 -5.798*** -5.734*** 
Invest_Grade 479 0.806 0.000 1.000 1.000 976 0.892 0.000 1.000 1.000 4.555*** 4.524*** 
Issue_Both 479 0.090 0.000 0.000 1.000 976 0.058 0.000 0.000 1.000 -2.225** -2.222** 
NI 384 0.804 -0.055 0.634 3.052 670 0.644 -0.055 0.514 3.052 -4.747*** -5.087*** 
Capex 384 0.066 0.004 0.039 0.599 670 0.096 0.004 0.064 0.599 5.057*** 7.463*** 
Returns_Var 384 0.088 0.029 0.079 0.270 670 0.090 0.029 0.081 0.270 1.007 1.242 
log(Fees) 398 8.377 4.344 8.327 13.412 845 7.250 3.784 7.237 11.321 -10.743*** -10.132*** 
ADR 398 0.384 0.000 0.000 1.000 845 0.251 0.000 0.000 1.000 -4.865*** -4.821*** 
Loss 398 0.141 0.000 0.000 1.000 845 0.102 0.000 0.000 1.000 -2.015** -2.012** 
Invrec 398 0.313 0.036 0.312 0.696 845 0.275 0.036 0.250 0.696 -3.983*** -4.935*** 
Opinion 398 0.003 0.000 0.000 1.000 845 0.001 0.000 0.000 1.000 -0.545 -0.545 
Big4 398 0.940 0.000 1.000 1.000 845 0.653 0.000 1.000 1.000 -11.347*** -10.805*** 
log(#_Segments) 398 1.608 0.000 1.609 2.398 845 1.524 0.000 1.609 2.398 -2.829*** -1.979** 
ASD 479 0.511 0.203 0.379 1.000 976 0.628 0.203 0.762 1.000 8.401*** 7.756*** 
Corruption 479 2.791 0.700 2.300 6.500 976 3.833 0.500 3.000 6.500 9.468*** 6.918*** 
Enforcement 479 44.307 20.000 45.000 54.000 976 41.554 20.000 37.000 54.000 -6.702*** -7.528*** 
GDP_Growth 479 1.352 -5.482 1.476 10.636 976 4.011 -5.482 3.102 10.636 14.693*** 13.437*** 
Law 479 0.259 0.000 0.000 1.000 976 0.199 0.000 0.000 1.000 -2.611*** -2.606*** 
Country_PoD 962 0.020 0.010 0.019 0.051 1,626 0.019 0.010 0.018 0.051 -2.400** -4.756*** 
Exchange_Risk 962 0.040 0.001 0.036 0.131 1,626 0.033 0.001 0.025 0.131 -7.372*** -10.724*** 
Term_Spread 962 1.504 -0.303 1.555 2.815 1,626 1.165 -0.303 1.042 2.815 -11.575*** -11.795*** 
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Notes: Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the full sample. Panel B reports descriptive statistics across Capitalizers and Expensers. T-test reports t-
statistics for differences in means between the two groups (two-tailed). Wilcox reports z-statistics for the Wilcoxon ranksum test (Mann-Whitney) to test the 
equality of the population between the two groups (two-tailed). Bond- and loan-specific variables are presented at issue-level, as every debt issue differs in its 
contractual terms. Firm-specific and country variables are presented at firm-year level. The variable Bond_Issue is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a 
debt issue is a bond issue, and zero otherwise. It is presented after multiple bonds/loans issued by the same firm within the same year are deleted. 
%_of_Bond_debt is calculated for each firm-year and equals the ratio of the total amount of borrowed public debt to the total amount of borrowed debt (public 
and private). Cost_of_debt for bonds is measured as the difference in basis points between the yield to maturity of a corporate bond at issue date and the 
interest yield of a treasury security (T-bill) issued by the same country with comparable maturity to the corporate bond. Cost_of_debt for syndicated loans is 
defined as the amount the borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR or a LIBOR equivalent. Debt_Amount is the size of each bond issue/syndicated loan 
facility in millions of USD. Maturity is the number of months from the date the debt is issued until its maturity. Callable is a dummy variable which is equal to 
one if a bond has a call feature, and zero otherwise. Private_Placement is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a bond is issued through private 
placements, and zero otherwise. Term_Loan is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a syndicated loan is a term loan, and zero otherwise. RD_Intensity is 
a firm’s total R&D expenditures divided by sales. RDCap is the amount of R&D a firm capitalized during a year divided by sales. RDExp is the amount of 
R&D a firm expensed during a year divided by sales. Lag_RDCap is the amount of R&D a firm capitalized in the previous year divided by previous year’s 
sales. RD_Value is the difference between market and book value of equity divided by current and lagged R&D expenditures. Cut_RD is a dummy variable 
which is equal to one if current R&D expenditures are lower than the previous year’s R&D expenditures, and zero otherwise. Beat_Zero is a dummy variable 
which is equal to one if the current year’s earnings assuming full expensing are smaller than the zero earnings threshold and the current year’s earnings 
assuming full capitalization are greater than the zero earnings threshold, and zero otherwise. Beat_Past is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm’s 
prior year earnings are higher than current year’s earnings assuming full expensing and smaller than current year’s earnings assuming full capitalization, and 
zero otherwise. Beat_Bench is a dummy which is equal to one if Beat_Zero and/or Beat_Past is equal to one, and zero otherwise. Log(Size) is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. MTB is the market value divided by the book value. Leverage is the ratio between total debt and total assets. ROA is the return on 
assets calculated as the ratio between EBIT and total assets. Tangibility is defined as the ratio between PPE and total assets. O_Score is Ohlson’s measure of 
default risk. Rated is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm’s debt issue is rated, and zero otherwise. Invest_Grade is a dummy variable which is 
equal to one if a firm’s debt issue has an investment grade rating, and zero otherwise. Issue_Both is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm issues at 
least one bond and one syndicated loan in a year. NI is the sum of future earnings measured from year t+1 to year t+3 scaled by the market value of equity. 
Capex is a firm’s capital expenditures divided by sales. Returns_Var is the standard deviation of a firm’s monthly stock return over the last fiscal year. 
Log(Fees) is the natural logarithm of audit fees. ADR is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm has an ADR listed on a US exchange, and zero 
otherwise. Loss is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a negative net income was reported, and zero otherwise. Invrec is the sum of inventories and 
receivables divided by total assets. Opinion is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm does not receive a standard unqualified audit opinion, and zero 
otherwise. Big4 is a dummy variable which is equal to one if an annual report was audited by a Big 4 auditor, and zero otherwise. Log(#_Segments) is the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of product segments. ASD is the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008). Country_PoD is the probability 
of default of a firm’s country of domicile in the year and month the bond/syndicated loan is issued. Corruption is the inverse of the Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI), taking higher values when a country suffers under higher levels of corruption. Enforcement is an index capturing the quality of audit function and 
degree of accounting enforcement in each country (Brown et al., 2014). Exchange_Risk controls for the exchange rate volatility of a firm’s country of domicile 
and is measured as the coefficient of variation of daily USD to local currency exchange rates for the twelve months before the bond/syndicated loan is issued. 
GDP_Growth is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Law is a dummy variable which is equal to one 
if a firm’s country of domicile is a common-law country, and zero otherwise. Term_Spread is the difference between a government’s ten-year and two-year T-
bill rate measured at the date a bond/syndicated loan is issued.   
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Table 4: Choice of source of debt financing – Public Debt Market vs. Private Syndicated Loan Market 
  Bond_Issue as dependent variable  %_ of_Bond_Debt as dependent variable 
VARIABLES  Full Sample Full Sample  Capitalizers  Expensers  Full Sample Full Sample Capitalizers Expensers 
  Model 1 – 
Probit 
Model 2 – 
IV Probit 
Model 3 – 
Probit 
Model 4 – 
Probit 
 
Model 5 – 
OLS 
Model 6 – 
2SLS 
Model 7 – 
OLS 
Model 8 – 
OLS 
Constant  -6.760*** -6.759*** -11.830*** -5.780***  -0.686*** -0.687*** -1.086*** -0.448** 
  (-8.28) (-8.28) (-6.80) (-6.08)  (-4.23) (-4.28) (-3.66) (-2.33) 
RDCap a  22.172*** 21.360*** 24.212***   5.436*** 4.991*** 5.656***  
  (3.08) (2.95) (2.59)   (3.08) (2.63) (2.81)  
RDExp  a  -0.332 -0.329 -1.096 -1.610  -0.032 -0.015 -0.153 -0.224 
  (-0.18) (-0.18) (-0.31) (-0.71)  (-0.07) (-0.03) (-0.18) (-0.43) 
log(Size)    0.365*** 0.364*** 0.546*** 0.316***  0.067*** 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.059*** 
  (5.75) (5.75) (5.91) (3.79)  (5.98) (6.05) (4.13) (4.11) 
CAP  -0.318** -0.312**    -0.079** -0.075**   
  (-2.35) (-2.28)    (-2.44) (-2.26)   
MTB a  0.032 0.032 0.020 0.052  0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 
  (1.36) (1.36) (0.57) (1.52)  (1.45) (1.47) (0.67) (1.40) 
Issue_Both  -0.456*** -0.455*** -0.276 -0.616***  -0.262*** -0.262*** -0.253*** -0.272*** 
  (-3.72) (-3.70) (-1.39) (-3.47)  (-8.06) (-8.16) (-5.52) (-5.85) 
Leverage a  -0.070 -0.064 -0.707 0.192  0.012 0.014 -0.174 0.071 
  (-0.17) (-0.16) (-0.91) (0.39)  (0.13) (0.16) (-1.12) (0.68) 
Tangibility a  0.697** 0.693** 1.010* 0.392  0.146** 0.145** 0.177 0.101 
  (2.36) (2.35) (1.93) (1.05)  (2.17) (2.17) (1.49) (1.36) 
Rated   1.801*** 1.801*** 1.983*** 1.786***  0.354*** 0.353*** 0.378*** 0.320*** 
  (11.96) (11.95) (8.20) (8.74)  (10.96) (11.07) (8.49) (7.62) 
Invest_Grade   0.355** 0.354** 0.010 0.401**  0.084** 0.083** 0.031 0.090* 
  (2.45) (2.44) (0.04) (1.98)  (2.48) (2.47) (0.64) (1.92) 
log(Debt_Amount)  -0.708*** -0.708*** -0.974*** -0.628***  -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.138*** -0.121*** 
  (-7.80) (-7.80) (-8.50) (-5.16)  (-9.19) (-9.31) (-6.99) (-6.19) 
log(Maturity)  0.773*** 0.773*** 1.771*** 0.633***  0.118*** 0.118*** 0.222*** 0.090*** 
  (7.84) (7.84) (6.52) (5.67)  (7.36) (7.45) (6.00) (5.05) 
GDP_Growth  a  0.058* 0.058* 0.045 0.058  0.015** 0.015** 0.015 0.006 
  (1.94) (1.95) (0.84) (1.53)  (2.24) (2.27) (1.12) (0.72) 
ASD   2.691*** 2.690*** 2.773** 2.467***  0.638*** 0.639*** 0.568** 0.540*** 
  (4.67) (4.67) (2.44) (3.65)  (4.28) (4.33) (2.33) (2.98) 
Law   -2.301*** -2.300*** -1.919*** -2.298***  -0.541*** -0.541*** -0.411*** -0.521*** 
  (-6.74) (-6.74) (-2.78) (-5.84)  (-6.38) (-6.45) (-2.86) (-5.17) 
Corruption  -0.074 -0.074 -0.128 -0.051  -0.016 -0.016 -0.038* 0.002 
  (-1.42) (-1.42) (-1.39) (-0.72)  (-1.21) (-1.23) (-1.97) (0.13) 
Term_Spread  a  -0.149* -0.149 0.015 -0.214*  -0.039* -0.039* 0.004 -0.057** 
  (-1.65) (-1.64) (0.10) (-1.89)  (-1.87) (-1.90) (0.13) (-2.08) 
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  Bond_Issue as dependent variable  %_ of_Bond_Debt as dependent variable 
Table 4 continued  Full Sample Full Sample   Capitalizers Expensers  Full Sample Full Sample Capitalizers Expensers 
Industry dummies  Included Included Included Included  Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies  Included Included Included Included  Included Included Included Included 
N  1,554 1,554 519 1,035  1,455 1,455 479 976 
Test on endogeneity   0.261     0.248   
Kleibergen-Paap   22.797**     27.700**   
Hansen J Statistic   4.077     6.188   
(Pseudo) – Adj. R2  0.423 0.452 0.480 0.392  0.40 0.40 0.45 0.37 
Cluster  Firm Firm Firm Firm  Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Mean VIF  2.83 2.84 3.19 3.04  2.85 2.86 3.17 3.06 
Notes: This table reports results regarding the effect of capitalized R&D on firms’ propensity for issuing bonds rather than borrowing funds from the syndicated 
loan market. Models 1 to 4 are estimated using a probit model with Bond_Issue as the dependent variable. This variable is equal to one if a debt issue is a bond 
issue, and zero otherwise. Models 4 to 8 are estimated using OLS with %_of_Bond_Debt as the dependent variable. This variable is calculated for each firm-
year and equals the ratio of the total amount of borrowed public debt to the total amount of debt (public and private). Models 3 and 7 (4 and 8) are estimated for 
Capitalizers (Expensers) only. Models 2 and 4 control for endogenity of R&D capitalization by documenting results from a two-stage-model (IV Probit/2SLS) 
estimation. RDCap is the amount of R&D a firm capitalized during a year divided by sales. RDExp is the amount of R&D a firm expensed during a year divided 
by sales. Log(Size) is the natural logarithm of total assets. CAP is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm capitalized R&D in the fiscal year directly 
prior to the debt issue date, and zero otherwise. MTB is the market value divided by the book value. Issue_Both is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a 
firm issues at least one bond and one syndicated loan in a year, and zero otherwise. Leverage is the ratio between total debt and total assets. Tangibility is 
defined as the ratio between PPE and total assets. Rated is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a debt issue is rated, and zero otherwise. Invest_Grade is a 
dummy variable which is equal to one if a debt issue has an investment grade rating, and zero otherwise. Log(Debt_Amount) is the natural logarithm of the size 
of each debt issue. Log(Maturity) is the natural logarithm of the number of months from the date the bond/syndicated loan is issued until its maturity. 
GDP_Growth is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. ASD is the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et 
al. (2008). Law is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm’s country of domicile is a common-law country, and zero otherwise. Corruption is the 
inverse of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), taking higher values when a country suffers under higher levels of corruption. Term_Spread is defined as the 
difference between a government’s ten-year and two-year T-bill rate measured at the date a bond/syndicated loan is issued. VIF is the Variance Inflation factor. 
Z-statistics (t-statistics) for models 1 to 4 (models 5 to 8) based on clustered standard errors at firm-level are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 




Table 5: Cost of public debt  
  Full Sample Full Sample  Expensers Capitalizers 
VARIABLES  Model 1 – 
OLS 
Model 2 – 
2SLS 
Model 3 – 
OLS 
Model 4 – 
OLS 
Constant  784.600*** 787.212*** 726.882*** 823.457*** 
  (12.67) (12.80) (8.85) (8.33) 
RDCap  a  -67.367 -509.582  -1197.287** 
  (-0.11) (-0.75)  (-2.09) 
RDExp  a  -198.115 -181.342 -474.817*** 422.775 
  (-1.52) (-1.41) (-2.93) (1.40) 
log(Size)    -26.398*** -26.366*** -30.584*** -21.793*** 
  (-8.75) (-8.82) (-8.49) (-4.44) 
CAP  -0.503 3.512   
  (-0.05) (0.35)   
ROA  a  -483.449*** -487.856*** -493.166*** -393.312*** 
  (-5.48) (-5.58) (-4.61) (-2.65) 
MTB  a  -0.894 -0.929 -1.762 -1.019 
  (-0.46) (-0.48) (-0.69) (-0.34) 
Leverage  a  98.068*** 100.744*** 83.620** 83.573* 
  (3.51) (3.64) (2.32) (1.93) 
Tangibility  a  -7.191 -9.387 10.960 -115.289*** 
  (-0.29) (-0.39) (0.37) (-3.02) 
Invest_Grade    -97.783*** -98.643*** -57.821*** -160.545*** 
  (-6.22) (-6.31) (-2.91) (-12.73) 
log(Debt_Amount)  -5.387 -5.432 0.143 -13.642** 
  (-1.32) (-1.35) (0.03) (-2.03) 
log(Maturity)  2.026 1.769 6.652 10.585 
  (0.33) (0.29) (0.85) (0.99) 
Callable  18.798* 18.439* 32.075** -4.577 
  (1.84) (1.82) (2.33) (-0.33) 
Private_Placement  -4.940 -4.940 2.762 -14.408 
  (-0.50) (-0.50) (0.23) (-0.84) 
Exchange_Risk  a  356.434* 355.163* 207.004 832.957*** 
  (1.83) (1.84) (0.81) (3.35) 
Country_PoD  a  3162.498*** 3150.988*** 3877.427*** 1837.750** 
  (4.29) (4.30) (4.17) (1.98) 
Industry dummies  Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies  Included Included Included Included 
N  1,866 1,866 1,237 629 
Test on endogeneity   1.243   
Kleibergen-Paap   31.002**   
Hansen J Statistic   6.788   
Adj. R2  0.36 0.36 0.34 0.46 
Cluster  Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Mean VIF  2.25 2.27 2.22 3.31 
Notes: This table reports results regarding the influence of capitalized R&D on the cost of public debt. Models 1 and 2 are 
estimated for the full sample, while models 3 and 4 are estimated separately for Expensers and Capitalizers. Model 2 controls 
for the endogenity of R&D capitalization by documenting results from a two-stage-model (2SLS) estimation. Dependent 
variable is a firm’s Cost_of_debt measured as the difference in basis points between the yield to maturity of a corporate bond at 
issue date and the interest yield of a treasury security (T-bill) issued by the same country with comparable maturity to the 
corporate bond. RDCap is the amount of R&D a firm capitalized during a year divided by sales. RDExp is the amount of R&D 
a firm expensed during a year divided by sales. Log(Size) is the natural logarithm of total assets. CAP is a dummy variable 
which is equal to one if a firm capitalized R&D in the fiscal year directly prior to the date a bond is issued, and zero otherwise. 
ROA is the return on assets, calculated as the ratio between EBIT and total assets. MTB is the market value divided by the book 
value. Leverage is the ratio between total debt and total assets. Tangibility is defined as the ratio between PPE and total assets. 
Invest_Grade is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a bond issue has an investment grade rating, and zero otherwise. 
Log(Debt_Amount) is the natural logarithm of the size of each bond. Log(Maturity) is the natural logarithm of the number of 
months from the date the bond is issued until its maturity. Callable is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a bond has a 
call feature, and zero otherwise. Private_Placement is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a bond is issued through 
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private placements, and zero otherwise. Exchange_Risk controls for the exchange rate volatility of a firm’s country of domicile 
and is measured as the coefficient of variation of daily USD to local currency exchange rates for the twelve months before the 
issue date. Country_PoD measures the probability of a firm’s country of domicile on the year and month the bond is issued. 
VIF is the Variance Inflation factor. T-Statistics based on clustered standard errors at firm-level are reported in parentheses. *, 
** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% (two-tailed) level, respectively. a Variables winsorized at the top and 
bottom 1 percentiles.  
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Table 6: Cost of private debt  
  Full Sample Full Sample  Expensers Capitalizers 
VARIABLES  Model 1 – 
OLS 
Model 2 – 
2SLS 
Model 3 – 
OLS 
Model 4 – 
OLS 
Constant  434.391*** 426.309*** 439.515*** 465.316*** 
  (5.72) (5.71) (3.79) (4.94) 
RDCap  a  -1060.444 -183.457  -2704.027** 
  (-1.05) (-0.12)  (-2.24) 
RDExp  a  -173.056 -186.849 -379.007 424.646 
  (-0.84) (-0.91) (-1.30) (0.97) 
log(Size)    -18.692*** -18.171*** -15.286 -27.356*** 
  (-2.83) (-2.80) (-1.62) (-3.92) 
CAP  -3.281 -9.174   
  (-0.21) (-0.55)   
ROA  a  -243.169* -236.085* -142.990 -481.537** 
  (-1.84) (-1.81) (-0.86) (-2.46) 
MTB  a  -5.210** -5.422** -7.246* -3.702 
  (-2.02) (-2.10) (-1.72) (-0.88) 
Leverage  a  203.779*** 200.993*** 196.963** 217.560** 
  (3.55) (3.55) (2.51) (2.58) 
Tangibility  a  -45.917 -43.380 -42.572 -61.197 
  (-1.36) (-1.31) (-0.94) (-1.21) 
Invest_Grade    -44.053** -44.512** -84.694*** 11.576 
  (-2.07) (-2.14) (-3.22) (0.43) 
log(Debt_Amount)  -7.874 -8.220 -12.588 0.831 
  (-1.20) (-1.28) (-1.49) (0.11) 
log(Maturity)  11.161 11.585 25.351** -6.723 
  (1.16) (1.23) (2.44) (-0.42) 
Term_Loan  69.744*** 69.681*** 68.724*** 60.802*** 
  (7.73) (7.92) (5.03) (4.88) 
Exchange_Risk  a  517.499* 532.555* 1001.788** -141.577 
  (1.82) (1.92) (2.46) (-0.31) 
Country_PoD  a  2220.254** 2252.749*** 1312.871 3535.400*** 
  (2.50) (2.59) (1.00) (2.79) 
Industry dummies  Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies  Included Included Included Included 
N  722 722 389 333 
Test on endogeneity   0.435   
Kleibergen-Paap   13.222*   
Hansen J Statistic   3.189   
Adj. R2  0.43 0.43 0.46 0.49 
Cluster  Firm Firm Firm Firm 
Mean VIF  2.01 2.02 2.09 2.49 
Notes: This table reports results regarding the influence of capitalized R&D on the cost of private debt. Models 1 and 2 
are estimated for the full sample, while models 3 and 4 are estimated separately for Expensers and Capitalizers. Model 2 
controls for endogenity of R&D capitalization by documenting results from a two-stage-model (2SLS) estimation. 
Dependent variable is a firm’s Cost_of_debt in a syndicated loan deal. It is measured as the amount the borrower pays 
in basis points over LIBOR or a LIBOR equivalent for each dollar drawn. RDCap is the amount of R&D a firm 
capitalized during a year divided by sales. RDExp is the amount of R&D a firm expensed during a year divided by sales. 
Log(Size) is the natural logarithm of total assets. CAP is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm capitalized 
R&D in the fiscal year directly prior to the date a syndicated loan is obtained, and zero otherwise. ROA is the return on 
assets, calculated as the ratio between EBIT and total assets. MTB is the market value divided by the book value. 
Leverage is the ratio between total debt and total assets. Tangibility is defined as the ratio between PPE and total assets. 
Invest_Grade is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a syndicated loan has an investment grade rating, and zero 
otherwise. Log(Debt_Amount) is the natural logarithm of the size of each loan facility. Log(Maturity) is the natural 
logarithm of the number of months from the date the syndicated loan is obtained until its maturity. Term_Loan is a 
dummy variable which is equal to one if a syndicated loan is a term loan, and zero otherwise. Exchange_Risk controls 
for the exchange rate volatility of a firm’s country of domicile and is measured as the coefficient of variation of daily 
USD to local currency exchange rates for the twelve months before the issue date. Country_PoD measures the 
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probability of a firm’s country of domicile on the year and month the syndicated loan is obtained. VIF is the Variance 
Inflation factor. T-Statistics based on clustered standard errors at firm-level are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** 





Table 7: Cost of debt – Signaling vs. Earnings Management  
  Cost of public debt  Cost of private debt 
VARIABLES  Model 1 – 
Signaling 
Model 2 –  
Earn. Mgmt. 
 Model 3 –  
Signaling 
Model 4 –  
Earn. Mgmt. 
Constant  850.568*** 810.505***  435.802*** 424.393*** 
  (6.29) (6.60)  (3.06) (3.21) 
RDCap  a  -2722.051*** -826.616  -3590.260** -1025.460 
  (-2.89) (-1.19)  (-2.21) (-0.66) 
RDExp  a  915.627 112.268  595.915 -271.250 
  (1.64) (0.34)  (1.05) (-0.67) 
log(Size)    -13.595** -25.778***  -28.806*** -20.241** 
  (-2.19) (-4.33)  (-3.19) (-2.04) 
ROA  a  -131.353 -530.552***  -436.213 -488.219** 
  (-0.59) (-2.80)  (-1.47) (-2.04) 
MTB  a  -0.143 -3.126  -6.737 -2.111 
  (-0.03) (-0.86)  (-1.12) (-0.48) 
Leverage  a  3.062 151.331***  189.588 203.566** 
  (0.06) (2.92)  (1.36) (2.20) 
Tangibility  a  -127.956** -90.911**  -79.053 -86.326 
  (-2.16) (-2.05)  (-0.81) (-1.27) 
Invest_Grade    -200.262*** -135.759***  21.379 -3.251 
  (-8.22) (-8.25)  (0.48) (-0.12) 
log(Debt_Amount)  -15.684** -14.932*  7.336 -7.864 
  (-2.35) (-1.98)  (0.79) (-0.65) 
log(Maturity)  0.986 19.739  -8.896 -9.103 
  (0.07) (1.61)  (-0.37) (-0.43) 
Callable  -29.341 0.632    
  (-1.21) (0.04)    
Private_Placement  7.104 -27.645    
  (0.30) (-1.46)    
Term_Loan     75.273*** 54.222*** 
     (4.49) (2.95) 
Exchange_Risk  a  360.561 1218.158***  -672.988 792.308 
  (0.78) (3.36)  (-1.09) (1.18) 
Country_PoD  a  1942.008 166.954  4545.535** 2221.448 
  (1.08) (0.12)  (2.34) (1.27) 
Industry dummies  Included Included  Included Included 
Year dummies  Included Included  Included Included 
N  258 371  187 146 
Adj. R2  0.46 0.49  0.40 0.61 
Cluster  Firm Firm  Firm Firm 
Mean VIF  5.72 3.07  3.32 3.06 
Notes: This table reports OLS results regarding the influence of capitalized R&D on the cost of public (models 1 and 2) and 
private debt (models 3 and 4) conditional on a firm’s motives for R&D capitalization. Models 1 and 3 include Capitalizers, for 
which R&D capitalization is not related to earnings management incentives. Models 2 and 4 include Capitalizers, for which R&D 
capitalization is related to earnings management incentives. Cost_of_debt for bonds is measured as the difference in basis points 
between the yield to maturity of a corporate bond at issue date and the interest yield of a treasury security (T-bill) issued by the 
same country with comparable maturity to the corporate bond. Cost_of_debt for syndicated loans is defined as the amount the 
borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR or a LIBOR equivalent for each dollar drawn. RDCap is the amount of R&D a firm 
capitalized during a year divided by sales. RDExp is the amount of R&D a firm expensed during a year divided by sales. Log(Size) 
is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is the return on assets calculated as the ratio between EBIT and total assets. MTB is 
the market value divided by the book value. Leverage is the ratio between total debt and total assets. Tangibility is defined as the 
ratio between PPE and total assets. Invest_Grade is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a debt issue has an investment grade 
rating, and zero otherwise. Log(Debt_Amount) is the natural logarithm of the size of each bond issue/syndicated loan facility. 
Log(Maturity) is the natural logarithm of the number of months from the date the bond/syndicated loan is issued until its maturity. 
Callable is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a bond has a call feature, and zero otherwise. Private_Placement is a 
dummy variable which is equal to one if a bond is issued through private placements, and zero otherwise. Term_Loan is a dummy 
variable which is equal to one if a syndicated loan is a term loan, and zero otherwise. Exchange_Risk controls for the exchange 
rate volatility of a firm’s country of domicile and is measured as the coefficient of variation of daily USD to local currency 
exchange rates for the twelve months before the date a bond/syndicated loan is issued. Country_PoD measures the probability of a 
firm’s country of domicile on the year and month the bond/syndicated loan is issued. VIF is the Variance Inflation factor. T-
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Statistics based on clustered standard errors at firm-level are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% (two-tailed) level, respectively. a Variables winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percentiles.  
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Table 8: R&D Capitalization and future benefits 




VARIABLES  Model 1 –  OLS Model 2 – OLS Model 3 – OLS 
Constant  -0.788* -0.514 -1.056* 
  (-1.96) (-1.10) (-1.74) 
RDCap a  11.502** 19.318** 6.300 
  (2.18) (2.38) (1.21) 
RDExp a  -0.667 -2.233 0.725 
  (-0.55) (-1.27) (0.49) 
Capex a  -0.287 0.050 -0.670 
  (-0.50) (0.09) (-0.55) 
log(Size)  0.035 0.054** 0.020 
  (1.46) (1.99) (0.66) 
MTB a  -0.070*** -0.083*** -0.075** 
  (-3.66) (-4.12) (-2.32) 
Returns_Var a  3.014*** 2.850** 3.271** 
  (2.85) (2.30) (2.35) 
Tangibility a  0.425 0.078 0.714** 
  (1.53) (0.23) (2.35) 
ADR   0.214** 0.150* 0.368** 
  (2.16) (1.72) (2.54) 
ASD   -0.312** -0.149 -0.281 
  (-2.21) (-0.72) (-1.30) 
Enforcement   0.015*** 0.009 0.019*** 
  (3.10) (1.47) (3.00) 
Corruption   0.018 0.014 0.047 
  (0.63) (0.53) (1.18) 
Industry dummies  Included Included Included 
Year dummies  Included Included Included 
N  384 173 211 
Adj. R2  0.30 0.36 0.35 
Cluster  Firm Firm Firm 
Mean VIF  2.35 2.94 2.41 
Notes: This table reports OLS results regarding the effect of a capitalizing firm’s R&D 
investments on future benefits. Model 1 documents the association between capitalized R&D 
and future benefits, irrespective of the firm’s earnings management incentives. Model 2 
includes Capitalizers, for which R&D capitalization is not related to earnings management 
incentives. Model 3 includes Capitalizers, for which R&D capitalization is related to earnings 
management incentives. The dependent variable is NI, which reflects a firm’s future benefits. It 
is calculated as the sum of future earnings measured from year t+1 to year t+3 scaled by the 
market value of equity. RDCap is the amount of R&D a firm capitalized during a year divided 
by sales. RDExp is the amount of R&D a capitalizing firm expensed during a year divided by 
sales. Capex is a firm’s capital expenditures divided by sales. Log(Size) is the natural logarithm 
of total assets. MTB is the market value divided by the book value. Returns_Variability is the 
standard deviation of a firm’s monthly stock returns over the fiscal year. Tangibility is defined 
as the ratio between PPE and total assets. ADR is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a 
firm has an ADR listed on a US exchange, and zero otherwise. ASD is the anti-self-dealing 
index from Djankov et al. (2008). Enforcement is an index capturing the quality of audit 
function and degree of accounting enforcement in each country (Brown et al., 2014). 
Corruption is the inverse of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), taking higher values when 
a country suffers under higher levels of corruption. VIF is the Variance Inflation factor. T-
Statistics based on clustered standard errors at firm-level are reported in parentheses. *, ** and 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% (two-tailed) level, respectively.a Variables 
winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percentiles. 
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Table 9: R&D Capitalization and audit fees 
  Full Sample Full Sample  Full Sample 
VARIABLES  Model 1 – 2SLS Model 2 – OLS Model 3 – OLS 
Constant  -3.152*** -3.161*** -3.162*** 
  (-7.76) (-7.83) (-7.89) 
RDCap  a  7.610** -4.329  
  (2.08) (-0.96)  
RDExp a  -0.987 -0.724  
  (-0.90) (-0.64)  
CAP   0.280*** 0.238*** 
   (3.16) (3.36) 
log(Size)    0.625*** 0.628*** 0.625*** 
  (27.99) (28.28) (28.31) 
MTB a  0.053*** 0.052*** 0.050*** 
  (4.22) (4.08) (3.97) 
ROA  a  -0.328 -0.288 -0.211 
  (-0.48) (-0.41) (-0.30) 
Leverage  a  -0.926*** -0.929*** -0.914*** 
  (-3.52) (-3.60) (-3.55) 
Loss  0.169* 0.168* 0.173* 
  (1.73) (1.71) (1.76) 
Invrec  a  -0.014 -0.058 -0.059 
  (-0.06) (-0.26) (-0.26) 
Opinion    -0.044 -0.040 -0.019 
  (-0.17) (-0.21) (-0.10) 
ADR  0.357*** 0.322*** 0.327*** 
  (3.83) (3.40) (3.53) 
Big4  1.144*** 1.101*** 1.104*** 
  (13.96) (13.07) (13.18) 
log(#_Segments) a  0.125** 0.119** 0.125** 
  (2.22) (2.08) (2.25) 
Exchange_Risk a  11.102*** 10.275*** 10.354*** 
  (5.85) (5.48) (5.53) 
ASD  -0.563*** -0.541*** -0.528*** 
  (-3.97) (-3.83) (-3.80) 
Industry dummies  Included Included Included 
Year dummies  Included Included Included 
N  1,243 1,243 1,243 
Test on endogeneity  2.715*   
Kleibergen-Paap  29.601***   
Hansen J Statistic  64.195***   
Adj. R2  0.84 0.84 0.84 
Cluster  Firm Firm Firm 
Mean VIF  2.10 2.11 2.11 
Notes: This table reports results regarding the effect of R&D capitalization on audit fees. While models 2 and 3 are estimated using 
OLS, model 1 controls for endogenity of R&D capitalization by documenting results from a two-stage-model (2SLS) estimation.The 
dependent variable is log(Fees), which is the natural logarithm of audit fees in thousands of USD. RDCap is the amount of R&D a 
firm capitalized during a year divided by sales. RDExp is the amount of R&D a firm expensed during a year divided by sales. CAP is a 
dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm capitalized R&D in the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Log(Size) is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. MTB is the market value divided by the book value. ROA is the return on assets, calculated as the ratio 
between EBIT and total assets. Leverage is the ratio between total debt and total assets. Loss is a dummy variable which is equal to 
one if a firm reported negative earnings in a fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Opinion is a dummy variable which is equal to one when a 
firm does not receive a standard unqualified audit opinion, and zero otherwise. ADR is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a 
firm has an ADR listed on a US exchange, and zero otherwise. Big4 is a dummy variable which is equal to one if a firm is audited by a 
Big 4 auditor, and zero otherwise. log(#_Segments) is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of product segments. 
Exchange_Risk controls for the exchange rate volatility of a firm’s country of domicile and is measured as the coefficient of variation 
of daily USD to local currency exchange rates for the twelve months prior to the fiscal year-end date. ASD is the anti-self-dealing 
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index from Djankov et al. (2008). VIF is the Variance Inflation factor. T-Statistics based on clustered standard errors at firm-level are 
reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% (two-tailed) level, respectively.a Variables 






























Table 10: Expected and Discretionary R&D Capitalization 
Panel A: Expected and Discretionary R&D Capitalization and firms’ propensity to borrow funds from public 
debt markets rather than the private syndicated loan market 
  Bond_Issue Bond_Issue %_of_Bond_Debt %_of_Bond_Debt 
VARIABLES  Model 1 –  
Full Sample 
Model 2 – 
Capitalizers 
Model 3 –  
Full Sample 
Model 4 –  
Capitalizers 
RDCap_Over  -7.192 24.496 0.139 5.261 
  (-0.31) (0.94) (0.03) (0.90) 
RDCap_Exp  21.691*** 24.056** 5.544*** 5.610*** 
  (3.09) (2.52) (3.11) (2.74) 
RDCap_Under  15.411 17.287 4.345 2.387 
  (0.73) (0.73) (0.66) (0.35) 
RDExp  -0.499 -1.205 -0.065 -0.215 
  (-0.27) (-0.34) (-0.14) (-0.24) 
CAP  -0.227  -0.063*  
  (-1.52)  (-1.75)  
Debt Issue Controls  Included Included Included Included 
Firm & Country Controls  Included Included Included Included 
Industry & Year f.e.  Included Included Included Included 
N  1,554 519 1,455 479 
(Pseudo) – Adj. R2  0.42 0.48 0.40 0.45 
Mean VIF  2.79 3.14 2.81 3.12 
      
      
Panel B: Expected and Discretionary R&D Capitalization and the cost of public debt  
  Cost of public 
debt 
Cost of public 
debt 
Cost of public 
debt 
 
VARIABLES  Model 1 –  
Capitalizers 
Model 2 –  
Signaling 
Model 3 –  
Earn. Mgmt. 
 
RDCap_Over  -2461.932 -4782.355 -1486.106  
  (-1.11) (-1.25) (-0.57)  
RDCap_Exp  -1104.543** -2539.779*** -819.537  
  (-2.00) (-2.76) (-1.25)  
RDCap_Under  -523.405 2931.127 -1387.235  
  (-0.34) (0.30) (-0.69)  
RDExp  399.765 942.652 95.895  
  (1.35) (1.60) (0.29)  
CAP      
      
Debt Issue Controls  Included Included Included  
Firm & Country Controls  Included Included Included  
Industry & Year f.e.  Included Included Included  
N  629 258 371  
Adj. R2  0.46 0.474 0.48  
Mean VIF  3.32 5.67 3.14  
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Panel C: Expected and Discretionary R&D Capitalization and the cost of private debt  
  Cost of private 
debt 
Cost of private 
debt 
Cost of private 
debt 
 
VARIABLES  Model 1 –  
Capitalizers 
Model 2 –  
Signaling 
Model 3–  
Earn. Mgmt. 
 
RDCap_Over  -1336.150 -704.847 -1896.575  
  (-0.82) (-0.32) (-0.46)  
RDCap_Exp  -2928.336** -6939.353** -1146.493  
  (-2.15) (-2.14) (-0.63)  
RDCap_Under  -929.375 -18111.766 788.707  
  (-0.29) (-0.62) (0.30)  
RDExp  314.906 723.277 -234.294  
  (0.89) (1.27) (-0.47)  
CAP      
      
Debt Issue Controls  Included Included Included  
Firm & Country Controls  Included Included Included  
Industry & Year f.e.  Included Included Included  
N  333 187 146  
Adj. R2  0.49 0.41 0.61  
Mean VIF  2.48 3.49 3.12  
      
      
Panel D: Expected and Discretionary R&D Capitalization and its effect on future benefits and audit fees 
  NI NI NI Audit fees 
VARIABLES  Model 1 –  
Capitalizers 
Model 2 –  
Signaling 
Model 3 –  
Earn. Mgmt. 
Model 4 –  
Full Sample 
RDCap_Over  9.332 16.454 -0.673 -17.082 
  (0.80) (1.22) (-0.04) (-1.33) 
RDCap_Exp  11.549** 20.336** 6.554 -3.095 
  (2.08) (2.37) (1.25) (-0.73) 
RDCap_Under  8.652 44.554 4.812 -9.077 
  (0.85) (0.43) (0.46) (-0.69) 
RDExp  -0.750 -2.212 0.575 -0.704 
  (-0.60) (-1.21) (0.40) (-0.63) 
CAP     0.297*** 
     (3.20) 
Debt Issue Controls  No No No No 
Firm & Country Controls  Included Included Included Included 
Industry & Year f.e.  Included Included Included Included 
N  384 173 211 1,243 
Adj. R2  0.30 0.35 0.34 0.85 
Mean VIF  2.35 2.93 2.45 2.11 
Notes: This table documents the effect of the expected, over and undercapitalized amount of R&D on a firm’s 
propensity to borrow funds from public debt markets rather than the syndicated loan market (Panel A), on its 
cost of public (Panel B) and private debt (Panel C), as well as on its future profitability (NI) and audit fees (Panel 
D). RDCap_Over is the amount of R&D a capitalizing firm overcapitalized beyond the expected amount. 
RDCap_Exp is the amount of R&D a capitalizing firm is expected to capitalize during a year given its specific 
characteristics. RDCap_Under is the amount of R&D a capitalizing firm undercapitalized compared to the 
expected amount. RDExp is the amount of R&D a firm expensed during a year. CAP is a dummy variable which 
is equal to one if a firm capitalized R&D during a year, and zero otherwise. In all models, we include the same 
issue, firm and country-specific control variables as in the previous analyses. Additionally, all models include 
industry and year fixed effects. VIF is the Variance Inflation factor. Z-Statistics/T-statistics based on clustered 
standard errors at firm-level are reported in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% (two-tailed) level, respectively. 
